Political Parties and Democratic Change in the Western Balkans:
When Do External Actors Change Agendas?

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The study of EU conditionality has focused on how the governments of candidate states have changed domestic policies, laws and institutions in order to qualify for EU membership. However, political parties are arguably the most important and most proximate source of domestic policy change – and thus of compliance or noncompliance with EU requirements. Scholars have shown that ruling political parties rarely comply with the EU's external requirements if the costs of compliance are too high and threaten to undermine the domestic sources of their political power. And after twenty years of observing post-communist party systems, we know that extremist and nationalist parties rarely fade away. Consequently, it is important to understand how parties construct and change their agendas, especially when they are in the opposition and able more easily to recalibrate their appeals.

My adapting model predicts that party systems of EU candidate states do follow a predictable evolution over time – and this is caused by participation in the EU's pre-accession process. In almost all cases, major political parties respond to EU leverage by embracing agendas that are consistent with EU requirements in the run up to negotiations for membership. As a consequence, the party systems – at least for a while – reflect a consensus on the general course of policymaking since joining the EU is a foreign policy goal with such substantial domestic requirements (Vachudova 2005; 2008). .

Candidate states where regime change in 1989 was followed by illiberal democracy or authoritarianism are the most interesting. For key parties in these states, pushing for EU accession is a marker of profound moderation in their agendas, including support for democratic standards and economic reform. Here adapting usually comes in two rounds: In the first rounds, reform-oriented parties in opposition to the authoritarian

ruling parties rally around a pro-EU agenda and adapt to it, often changing their positions on issues such as ethnic minority rights and domestic reform. In the second round, the authoritarian and anti-EU parties themselves "adapt" their agendas to fit with liberal democracy and EU requirements, realizing that this is the only way to get back into the electoral game. The party systems of Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Croatia all fit this model – with the HDZ in Croatia adapting most dramatically in the second round after its defeat in 2000 (Vachudova 2008).

What about the other Western Balkans states that remain in the EU's membership queue? There is tremendous variation among the domestic conditions in these states. A full decade has now passed since the fall of the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milošević in what is now Serbia, and more than fifteen years have passed since the Dayton Agreement marked the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet despite huge differences in their domestic politics, Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia and even Croatia share some common attributes: a low quality democracy (especially as measured by the rule of law), low state capacity, high levels of corruption, and low levels of economic growth as compared to the post-communist states that joined the EU in 2004.[1] Some major parties still use ethnic scapegoating to win votes and to distract citizens from failed social and economic policies. Myriad external actors including the U.S. government, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and internationally-connected non-governmental institutions have played a part in domestic developments. Whatever their specific work or agenda in the region, virtually all of them cite EU membership as the over-arching goal. Yet the commitment of ruling elites to qualifying for EU membership has waxed and waned, opening up the question whether domestic conditions in some states are fundamentally different from those in other post-communist states that were previously in the EU membership queue.

The most exciting case for the adapting model is Serbia. A full decade has passed since the fall of the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milošević in what is now Serbia. Yet Serbia's commitment to qualifying for European Union (EU) membership has

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[1] The post-communist states that joined in 2004 were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. On the World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank, Croatia consistently scores better than Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia on aggregate indicators of democracy, government performance and regulatory quality; however, it still scores in the range of Bulgaria and Romania that joined the EU in 2007 and are now widely seen as deficient in several areas especially the rule of law and the fight against corruption. Freedom House indicators show similar results.

wavered and stalled, opening up the question whether domestic conditions there are somehow unique to post-communist, EU-eligible Europe. The purpose of studying Serbia is two-fold. The first is to examine whether or not Serbian political parties are changing their agendas as predicted by the adapting model. Have the pro-reform parties adapted a thoroughly EU-compatible agenda? And what about the authoritarian and extreme nationalist former ruling parties? I argue that there have been some dramatic shifts in party agendas over the last five years, as predicted by the model. However, the Serbian party system still looks quite different than that of previous candidates on the eve of the launch of accession negotiations.

The second purpose is to explore *why* a consensus on qualifying for EU membership has been so slow to develop among Serbia's main parliamentary parties. Why has the governing coalition of Serbia oscillated between pro-EU parties and those whose policies essentially dictate a different path, one closer to Russia and further away from the EU?   The answer to this question rests chiefly with the electoral and economic calculations of key politicians in Serbia's large, extreme nationalist and anti-Western parties, the Serbian Radical Party (SNS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). However, Serbia's main "reformist" party, the Democratic Party (DS), has also been slow to adapt fully to a pro-EU agenda on some issues.

My hypotheses about these calculations are preliminary. First, the conditioning of a large portion of the Serbian electorate to respond to nationalist appeals and to allow them to overshadow socio-economic issues gives parties little reason to abandon them – especially as long as the Kosovo issue dominates domestic politics. Moreover, a variant of "ethnic outbidding" has taken place: nationalist parties have successfully cast the retention of Kosovo as the top priority of Serbian politics, making it apparently impossible for the other major parties to abandon it.   Second, many Serbian political elites – and/or their financial backers – profit from wide spread mafia control of the economy and from endemic corruption. Still, agendas are now changing, and it will be part of my field research next year to uncover how party leaders assess the changing domestic electoral and economic environment.

The rest of this paper will be organized in four parts. The first presents a brief sketch of the main theories about how external leverage impacts domestic candidates in

EU-eligible states. The second describes how, as part of a wider body of work, I will measure the positions of political parties in post-communist party systems. The third explores how well the adapting model explains party agenda change in Serbia. Some parties have shifted dramatically to an EU-compatible agenda, while others are still holding anti-EU positions. In the conclusion I argue that nevertheless recent party agenda shifts have been substantial, and that Serbia's major political parties may yet reach consensus on EU integration as predicted by the adapting model. The longer-term goal for this paper is to include a comparison with changes in the party system in Macedonia and Bosnia as well.

1. Theoretical Debate

Exploring the interplay between domestic communist legacies and EU leverage brings a fresh perspective to the debate about political competition in postcommunist states. There is substantial agreement that the robustness of political competition is a better measure for the quality of democracy in the East than the simpler measures of party performance, party system stability and voter loyalty used for the West. Scholars have focused on the presence or absence of strong, programmatic political competition between political parties, factions or 'poles' that alternate in power and limit the rent-seeking and patronage opportunities of governing parties. Others look at the configuration of domestic elites at the moment of regime change; the outcome of the first democratic elections; and the character of political competition and protest in the new polity.[2] Scholars have also engaged in a lively debate on the definition and the determinants of robust political competition, examining the effects of ideological polarization, politicization of the state apparatus, and institutional incentives for collusion. Though this literature is diverse, it has one basic feature in common: Its near-exclusive focus on *domestic* factors that affect political competition.

One of the central challenges for comparative politics and international relations studies is to identify the specific mechanisms that translate international influence into

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[2] Among many: Bunce 1999; Fish 1998; Grzymala-Busse 2003; Grzymala-Busse 2008; Hellman 1998; O'Dwyer (2004); and Orenstein (2001).

changes in the positions of political parties and the behavior of domestic elites. Recent works in comparative politics have made great strides in systematically exploring how external actors impact domestic politics.[3] Looking only at the EU's candidates and proto-candidates, I have focused on three mechanisms that guide and constrain the actions of governments are important. First, straightforward *conditionality* is at play: moving forward in the EU's pre-accession process is tied to adopting laws and implementing reform in different policy areas and also restructuring the state administration.[4] Often, this process creates external legitimation for domestic preferences, allowing politicians to sell policies that they have long supported (Grabbe 2006). Second, the process itself serves as a *credible commitment* mechanism to ongoing reform, because reversing direction becomes prohibitively costly for any future government. As candidates move forward in the process, governments are thus locked into a predictable course of economic policymaking that serves as an important signal to internal and external economic actors. Meanwhile, moving toward EU membership changes the character and the strength of different *groups in society*, increasing the pressure on the governing political parties to deliver the necessary reforms (Epstein 2008). Early evidence shows that while the pace of reform may slow down after accession, there is little or no backsliding as old mechanisms continue to work, and new ones come on line (see Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2009; Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010; Spendzharova and Vachudova 2011).

The conditionality and the credible commitment mechanisms work mainly on political parties that are in power and therefore have to deliver progress within the framework of the EU's pre-accession process. What positions on European integration did these parties bring with them to office? There is evidence that being in power during the pre-accession process does push parties to take positions that are somewhat more supportive of European integration than would otherwise be predicted by their ideological profile or party family (Vachudova and Hooghe 2009). However, ruling parties with domestic sources of political power that are antithetical to the requirements

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[3] Two examples that stand for many: Levitsky and Way 2010; and Bunce and Wolchik 2011.

[4] See, among many, Cameron 2007; Epstein 2008; Grabbe 2006; Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004; Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2004; Sissenich 2007; and Vachudova 2005.

of EU membership never make a radical shift to bring their domestic policies into compliance with the EU (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig 2007; Vachudova 2005). It follows that parties that govern while the country is making across-the-board progress in satisfying EU requirements must have adopted an EU-compatible agenda prior to taking power.

Anchored in the logic that material rewards create incentives for compliance with EU rules, the "adapting model" makes a rationalist argument that engages a debate that has emerged in the international relations literature between so-called rationalist and constructivist approaches. Both seek to identify the specific mechanisms that translate international influence into change: change in the behavior of domestic elites, and change in broader domestic outcomes. Studies in the rationalist camp generally argue that mechanisms based on material interests and rewards explain the lion's share of policy change owing to international influence.

Studies in the constructivist camp argue that other, cognitive mechanisms based on the power of norms and the desire for approbation from Western actors must *also* be taken into account to understand fully the timing and content of externally-driven domestic change (Epstein 2005a; Gheciu 2005; Grabbe 2006). To give an example, rationalists point to strategic learning from transnational actors on the part of East European elites (Vachudova 2005), while constructivists would expect to find social learning that is not based on the expectation of political or economic gain (see Epstein 2005b; for a different take, Bunce and Wolchik 2006).

Falling within the broad constructive camp, Jelena Subotic makes an innovative and persuasive argument for why Serbia's political parties have been slow to get on board with European integration while in neighboring Croatia political parties and governments have rapidly conformed agendas and policies to the expectations of the EU pre-accession process. Subotic argues that in states where the European idea is not broadly shared, pro-European groups will find it hard to forge crosscutting coalitions needed to successfully promote European integration with all its associated costs. She argues that the process of *identity convergence* explains Croatia's rapid compliance with controversial EU requirements while in neighboring Serbia *identity divergence* has derailed Serbia's EU candidacy (Subotic 2010).

I take on board Subotic's argument that European integration and "the European idea" has been a much more fundamental part of the national discourse in Croatia than in Serbia since the fall of communism (Subotic 2010). However, I also see clear electoral and economic rewards for Serbia's political parties that choose to keep an anti-EU agenda. In 2008, their chance of winning the elections with this agenda was considered excellent – and clinging to a Kosovo-centered, nationalist campaign was surely easier than the alternative. Also, the economic benefits of stalling EU integration are real for party members and their backers. Finally, the EU is arguably asking Serbia to incur real costs in order to qualify for membership, including giving up Kosovo and taking the blame for the majority of the war crimes prosecuted by the ICTY. Yet Subotic helps us understand why these party platforms are sustainable, even in a country where most citizens do support joining the EU in opinion polls. In the longer run, however, the "adapting model" is likely to play itself out since ultimately the incentives of EU membership combined with the popularity of joining the EU among Serbia's electorate will compel most if not all major parties to shift their agendas to make them EU compatible.

When studying the party systems of candidate and proto-candidates states, there are two main tasks. The first is to examine whether or not political parties are changing their agendas – and what factors are important for triggering change. I argue that there have been some dramatic shifts in party agendas over the last ten years, as predicted by the model (see also Konitzer 2010). The case with the most change is clearly Croatia. The Serbian, Bosnian and Macedonian party systems have experienced change as well, but still look quite different from those of previous candidates on the eve of accession negotiations. My hypothesis is that the EU does make a reform agenda more attractive through the incentives built into the pre-accession process. However, there are two important caveats: First, it has had to increase the rewards and reduce the requirements in order to gain traction on domestic politics (see also Noutcheva 2007; Pond 2006). Second, its influence is entangled with the influence of other external actors, including other international institutions, the U.S., other foreign governments, and transnational networks of non-governmental organizations (see Bunce and Wolchik 2011). This was of course also true in the post-communist states that have already joined the EU, but in the Western Balkans this has been

amplified by much greater and more sustained direct involvement long after states have already begun negotiations for EU membership.

The second task is to explain why some parties have been rapid and others have been slow to develop a pro-EU agenda, primarily by conducting interviews in each country. My hypotheses are as follows: First, the conditioning of a portion of the electorate to respond to nationalist appeals and to allow them to overshadow socio-economic issues gives some parties little reason to abandon them. How politicians treat identity matters, but so do legacies of conflict and of Subotic's "European idea." Second, a variant of "ethnic outbidding" has taken place: nationalist parties have successfully cast certain nationalist issues as the top priority, making it apparently impossible for other major parties to abandon them. Third, some political elites – and their financial backers – profit from wide spread mafia control of the economy and from endemic corruption, making compliance with EU requirements undesirable and participation in the internal market unattractive. Finally, the gap between EU requirements and the ability of state institutions to implement desired reforms creates a feedback loop that undermines political will. This is exacerbated in Bosnia, for example, by institutional roadblocks that contribute to an especially large gap between rhetoric and action (Bose 2002; Bieber 2006; Burg and Shoup 1999).

2. Measurement: How do we know when parties change their agendas?

I use the Chapel Hill dataset on the positions of national political parties that depicts the structure of political competition in the EU's post-communist candidate states, and sheds some light on how political parties bundle different issues.[5] The dataset provides the position of each party on European integration, as well as its position on two dimensions of political competition: the left/right economic dimension, and the gal/tan cultural dimension. '*Gal*' stands for green/alternative/libertarian (or socially liberal) and '*tan*' for traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (or socially conservative, though this label tends to underplay the authoritarian and nationalism positions of the *tan* parties in the

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[5] For post-communist Europe, the dataset for 2006 includes Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The dataset for 2002 includes all of the same countries except Estonia. Dataset and codebook are available from http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe.

east). This data set is built using expert surveys: A team of researchers asks experts—academics specializing in political parties or European integration—to evaluate how party leaders defined the positions of their political parties on European integration, and on three ideological dimensions for European political parties. The time point of reference for the figures in this paper is 2006, and the analysis is confined to parties with two percent or more of the vote in the national election the most proximate prior year.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the different axes of competition in the east and the west in 2006. The main axis of domestic party competition in the East is at a ninety degree angle to that in the West (Evans and Whitefield, 1993). This was even more pronounced in the 2002 data. Since then, some parties in the east have shifted away from the *left* and *tan* quadrant. Parties that combine *left* and *tan* positions are almost absent from the west. The presence of these parties in the east is a strong legacy of communist party rule, which combined extreme left-wing economic ideology with strong authoritarianism and nationalism. Since 1989, this "communist magnet" has held parties in the *left-tan* quadrant. Meanwhile, the "EU magnet" has helped pull parties into the *right-gal* quadrant, since joining the EU required governments to implement free market reforms and to safeguard the rights and freedoms of all of their citizens, including ethnic and other minorities (Vachudova and Hooghe 2009).

We can see in Figure 2 (below) that support for European integration in the east is correlated with party positions that are economically *right* and socially *gal* (meaning socially liberal). This is less striking than in the 2002 data set: more pro-European parties now also sit in the *left* and *gal* quadrant. Opposition to the EU is concentrated in the economically *left* and socially *tan* quadrant – and hard *left* and hard *tan* positions are *never* combined with support for European integration. This is consistent with earlier research on that finds that pro-Europeanism in the East is concentrated among parties with *right* and *gal* positions, and anti-Europeanism among *left* and *tan* parties (Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2005; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). This is distinct from the West, where pro-European attitudes are associated with *left* and *gal* party positions and anti-European attitudes with *right* and *tan* positions (Marks et. al 2006).

Party system positioning in the four Western Balkan states (Figures 3-6) is

certainly more complicated than in the ten post-communist states before and during their negotiations for EU membership. In Bosnia positions on ethnicity and territory have kept all but one party in the *tan* quadrants. In Macedonia the nationalist parties emerged in opposition to the communist system, and we therefore see an axis of political competition that resembles Western Europe (in some ways) (see Rovny 2011). In Croatia accelerated preparations for EU membership have pushed several parties away from hard *tan* positions and toward *gal* positions. In Serbia we see the typical post-communist axis of political competition, between strongly *tan* and economically *left* parties – and those that have embraced more culturally progressive *gal* positions along with more *right* positions associated with implementing liberalizing market reforms in Serbia. The 2011 party survey for these countries is in the field currently (in the fall of 2011). So shortly we will see whether and how much political parties are moderating their agendas over time in all four countries.

3. Serbia's Political Parties: Holding Out or Adapting, As Predicted?

How well does the adapting model explain changes in party positions on European integration in Serbia?   One extreme nationalist political party, the Socialists (SPS) has moderated its agenda significantly over the last few years while another, the Radicals (SRS) has split into two parties over the issue of European integration (see also Konitzer 2010). Moreover, the strongly pro-EU Liberal Democratic Party has formed and gained seats; it is the only party in the Serbian parliament that declares that Kosovo is lost and Serbia should move on. However, Koštunica's DSS has become more nationalist and less supportive of European integration since about 2007. Moreover, Serbia's pro-European party par excellence, the DS, is itself ambivalent on some issues. With the exception of the LDP, all of the parties – including the DS – have basically the same position on Kosovo: that keeping the province must be Serbia's highest priority. Political contestation takes place primarily around the issue of joining the EU and related debates about economic and institutional reform. Serbia is viewed as being still far away from EU membership, even if negotiations may now finally be around the corner. And yet it is fascinating how political contestation among Serbia's parties is almost entirely

organized around whether and under what conditions to satisfy the requirements of EU membership. This debate, moreover, is sometimes cast as an explicit competition between EU and Russian influence.[6]

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Slobodan Milošević's former party, became gradually more pro-European in the run-up to the 2008 elections. It is now the main coalition partner to the DS in what is widely described as Serbia's "pro-European" government. It has consistently placed itself on the pro-European side of various issues since helping to form this government. The other "big mover" has been former Radical (SRS) leader Tomislav Nikolić who was reportedly expelled from the party because of his pro-EU views. He has formed a new party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) – but the "adapting" of this party to an EU-compatible agenda has been only partial. Still, the party has accepted EU membership as a goal for Serbia – and for this Nikolic was denounced as a "traitor" by the nominal head of the Radicals (SRS), Vojislav Šešelj, who is on trial for war crimes at the Hague.

For its part, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), has moved away from a broadly pro-EU stance. The rhetoric of its leader Vojislav Koštunica has become increasingly hostile towards the EU, repeating again and again that the EU does not see Serbia "as an equal partner." This is very similar to the rhetoric of Slovakia's Vladimir Meciar and Romania's Ion Iliescu when they controlled authoritarian regimes in the 1990s. His mix of anti-EU and nationalist appeals is impressive. For example, he recently declared that "by forcing Serbia to establish good neighborly relations with the fake state of Kosovo, the EU shows that its real goal is not to have Serbia as its member for many years to come. A state that renounces a part of its territory cannot deserve anyone's respect, not even that of the EU, but can only be permanently underestimated and humiliated."[7]

The adoption of the Srebrenica Declaration by the Serbia parliament in March 2010 highlights the distance that remains between Serbia's parliamentary parties. The declaration condemns the massacre of more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995, admitting that "not all was done to prevent this tragedy." Both the DS

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[6] "Lavrov: Elections prove Serbia's democratic character," *B92*, 14 May 2008.

[7] "DSS leader unhappy with EU," *B92,* 27 August 2010.

and the SPS voted for the resolution (along with some smaller parties).[8] The declaration
elicited very strong condemnation from some Serbian parties on nationalist grounds, even
though many observers in Serbia and in Bosnia felt that the declaration did not go far
enough, chiefly because it did not describe the massacre as genocide. This view was
publicly shared by only one party, the LDP. Harsh criticisms that the declaration was
unnecessary or went too far came from the DSS and the Radicals.[9] Koštunica declared
that the declaration would be an example of immoral policy and a degradation of the Serb
people.[10] For their part, only 20.6% of Serbia's citizens supported the declaration
according to a poll published in the Novi Sad daily *Dnevnik*.[11] This declaration is more
useful for understanding party positions than anything related to Kosovo, where most
parties have tried to be indistinguishable in their positions from the nationalist parties.

Here on electoral and economic incentives for parties to change – or not: I am especially
interested in the economic incentives for parties to hold on to anti-EU positions, in part
because they are supported by networks of "economic elites" that profit from organized
crime and Serbia's only partially reformed economy. This will be part of my field
research in the Western Balkans next year.

4. Conclusion

One thing is certain and quite (comparatively) stunning: the extent to which party
competition in Serbia is now *defined* by Serbia's relationship with the EU. The fault
lines between the ruling coalition and the opposition parties in this parliament are very
often described in terms of policies toward the EU. The fall of the coalition government
made up of the DS and the DSS (and some smaller parties) was triggered according to

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[8] "SPS to vote for Srebrenica resolution," *B92*, 9 February 2010.

[9] Bojana Barlovac and Sabina Niksic, "Adoption of Srebrenica Declaration Draws Mixed Reactions,"
Balkan Insight, 31 March 2010.

[10] "DSS: Srebrenica declaration degrading," *B92,* 2 February 2010.

[11] No information was available about this poll, such as the phrasing of the question, the sample size or
even the date. [Ask Jovan.] See "Opinion poll on Srebrenica resolution," *B92,* 3 February 2010.

both former partners by fundamental disagreement over EU policies (Sebastián 2008). The formation of the DS-SPS coalition government in July 2008 was widely described as a victory for the EU and a defeat for Russia. Of course, the wide reach of EU conditionality means that Serbia's most sensitive 'national' issues – Kosovo and cooperation with the ICTY – are both cast in terms of cooperation with the EU. In fact, the DSS and the Radicals (SRS) claim that Serbia will have to give up Kosovo formally in order to enter the EU.

So far, neither electoral nor economic incentives have been strong enough to change the positions of some of Serbia's largest political parties – at least not in a systematic, consistent way. However, as predicted by the model, two important parties have changed: The Socialists and the Radical splinter party. Looking forward, there are many reasons to believe that most of Serbia's mainstream political parties *will* change their positions, as predicted by the adapting model. Joining the EU has been popular with the Serbian electorate.[12] This may well help explain the victory of the pro-EU parties in the 2008 elections, which rewarded parties that had shifted toward stronger EU support. As Serbia moves forward in the pre-accession process, the "lock-in" mechanism will kick in: citizens and interest groups will not want to see backsliding but instead progress toward the goal of full membership. Since the governing coalition led by the Democratic Party (DS) took office in 2008, Serbia has become more firmly anchored in the EU's pre-accession process. Serbia officially applied for membership in December 2009 after receiving positive signs from Brussels. The Council of the European Union submitted Serbia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) for ratification in June 2010 after years of delay due to Serbia's insufficient cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Following on the capture of Radko Mladic in May 2011, the EU Commission will finally hand down an Opinion on Serbia's application for membership in xx 2011, opening up the likelihood of accession negotiations starting in 2012.

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[12] Support for EU membership in Serbia was high, but has steadily declined. According to a November 2009 report by the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID), 71% of Serbs support EU entry, up from 61% in October 2009 (EurActiv 22 February 2010). According to a June 2011 poll, only 53% of Serbs support EU entry. *B92,* 8 July 2011.

The EU's popularity, however, has decreased substantially over the last two years. This follows the general trend that EU accession becomes less popular as citizens understand more clearly the actual process and consequences of joining the EU. However, it also reflects growing EU pressure on Serbia related to the ICTY and especially to Kosovo. Recent tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have reinvigorated the Kosovo issue in Serbian politics. Normal disillusionment with the EU combined with how Serbian voters react to the Kosovo issue could still yield some electoral surprises for the EU in Serbia

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Figure 1: Positions of Political Parties in Western Europe, 2006

West in 2006

Legend:
- strongly opposed
- opposed
- somewhat opposed
- neutral
- somewhat in favor
- in favor
- strongly in favor
- Fit line for Total

R Sq Linear = 0.403

X-axis: Economic left-right
Y-axis: Social tan-gal

Figure 2: Positions of Political Parties in Post-Communist Europe, 2006

Figure 3: Positions of Political Parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2007

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

EU MEMBERSHIP
▼ opposed
▽ somewhat opposed
◇ neutral
✳ somewhat in favor
✳ 6.00
　 Fit line for Total

R Sq Linear = 0.156

Figure 4: Positions of Political Parties in Croatia, 2007

CROATIA

Figure 5: Positions of Political Parties in Macedonia,
2007

MACEDONIA

Figure 6: Positions of Political Parties in Serbia,
2007

SERBIA

EU MEMBERSHIP
▼ opposed
▽ somewhat opposed
◇ neutral
✳ in favor
✴ strongly in favor
⟍ Fit line for Total

R Sq Linear = 0.871

Figure 7: Positions of Political Parties in Turkey, 2007

TURKEY

R Sq Linear = 0.343