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# Political Integration in the European Community

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## I. Introduction

When, in January 1966, France resumed its normal participation in the councils of ministers of the three European communities after a seven-month boycott, Walter Hallstein commented: "People are now more strongly and deeply aware than before of the value of the Community, not as a project, a piece of machinery, but as a part of our political life, full of stresses and contradictions, yet possessed of a strong, unifying dynamism."<sup>1</sup> This type of enthusiasm is not uncommon among those Europeans dedicated to the eventual emergence of a strongly integrated political community. It is only with the greatest determination that a student of politics and international relations can preserve the objectivity necessary to assess the degree to which the nations of Western Europe may be on the way to forming a new supra-national political unity.

The question which this paper will investigate is: to what extent is a "sense of community" developing in this area which could serve as an infra-structure for further institutional formation at the supra-national level? There are some students of European integration who feel that this atmosphere will come about automatically if the political institutions can be established; others feel that adequate political institutions must develop in response to a demand by the general public. It is the position of this paper that both levels of integration are important: no matter how much consensus for integration exists in a society, integration cannot be formalized until political institutions have been established which are strong enough to bear the responsibility for guiding that consensus into constructive channels. At the same time, it must also be assumed that the building of institutions by themselves without the necessary general consensus to accompany them will not be effective. The development of political community is thus considered as a parallel process of developing political institutions at one level and increasing consensus for their acceptance at the other level. This process is not viewed as a smooth, continuously combined development but rather as a sort of overlapping, leapfrog type of movement.

The indices of the degree to which this infrastructure is developing (or has developed) will be borrowed from Karl W. Deutsch's theory of amalgamated security communities. In his work on the North Atlantic area he lists twelve background conditions essential to integration. Integration is defined by Professor Deutsch as "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a long time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population." A

<sup>1</sup>*European Community*, London ed., Feb. 1966, 12.

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## L'intégration politique de la communauté européenne

*L'établissement d'institutions économiques supranationales est susceptible de créer une tendance à l'intégration politique, tendance qui se manifeste par le développement simultané d'institutions politiques et d'un « esprit communautaire », dans l'opinion publique des pays en cause. Comme les institutions économiques du Marché commun (CEE, CECA, Euratom) ont assez bien réalisé leurs objectifs économiques, il était intéressant d'examiner si ces institutions ont eu un tel effet sur les opinions socio-politiques, les attitudes et les organismes qui avaient contribué à l'émergence d'un esprit communautaire supranational. Les quatorze « indices » de Karl Deutsch, pour la mesure de l'intensité des tendances à l'intégration politique au niveau international, ont été examinés en rapport avec chacun des six Etats-nations de la CEE.*

*L'enquête montre que, jusqu'à maintenant, est négligeable tout nouveau développement institutionnel de nature politique. Il y a toutefois quelque preuve d'amplification d'un « esprit communautaire » au niveau non gouvernemental. Pour huit des quatorze conditions dégagées par Deutsch, on a observé des évolutions considérables; pour quatre autres, des évolutions moindres; tandis qu'on n'a rien relevé de significatif en rapport aux deux dernières.*

*En acceptant ces quatorze conditions comme « indices », on peut conclure qu'elles sont suffisamment remplies pour établir que s'est développé un consensus public propre à consolider les institutions supra-nationales. Ce consensus résulte en grande partie de la création des communautés économiques et du succès de leurs réalisations. On peut maintenant s'attendre au développement d'une superstructure dont l'orientation politique soit davantage affirmée.*

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sense of community is defined as a condition in which there is at least agreement on the point "that common social problems must and can be solved by the process of peaceful change."<sup>2</sup>

## II. Method of investigation

In presenting his twelve indicators for what he calls an amalgamated security community, Deutsch suggests that these might be necessary as a precondition for political integration at the international level. According to his definition, a political community is "a community of persons in which common or coordinated facilities for the making of decisions and the enforcement of commands are supplemented by habits of compliance sufficiently widespread and predictable to make successful enforcement in the remaining cases of non-compliance probable at an economically and culturally feasible cost."<sup>3</sup>

The twelve essential requirements for integration were selected by a number of social scientists from the results of an interdisciplinary study at Princeton University's Center for Research on World Political Institutions. Karl W. Deutsch, Richard W. Van Wagenen, and six other scholars investigated eight historical cases where the problem of integration seemed particularly pertinent. The twelve tests of integration were those variables which were in evidence in all cases of successful amalgamation and were therefore considered to be significant for community formation. When these conditions were applied to the North Atlantic area,

<sup>2</sup>Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, 1957), 11.

<sup>3</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (Garden City, NY, 1954), 40.

however, it was discovered that a slight reformulation of these tests would greatly aid in adapting them to more modern conditions. The original twelve were therefore reorganized into fourteen points.

### III. Measurement of political integration

Although all Deutsch's fourteen conditions will be investigated, his sequence has been slightly altered to allow for greater continuity of thought.

#### COMPATIBILITY OF MAJOR VALUES

According to Deutsch, major values are those which are apparently of major significance in the internal politics of the areas concerned. However, no value should be included which is not perceived by each political unit as being important and which, at the same time, is considered important in their common relationship.

Religious ideology must be considered as one of the major values of all the participating units. Although one may consider the Catholic-Protestant debate as an obstacle to compatibility, certainly there is little recognized religious belief of any significance that is non-Christian in this area. The only other ideology that

TABLE I

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS IN THE COMMUNITY\*  
(figures in percentage of population from 1961 estimates)

Religion	Belgium	France	West Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands
Catholic	86.5	26.0†	44.0	91.0	90.1	38.5
Protestant	na	1.7	49.5	0.1	0.8	44.0
Jewish	0.4	na	00.6	0.1	na	0.2
Other	na	na	na	na	na	17.0

\**Europa Year Book, 1963, I* (London, 1963).

†The reliability of this figure is open to question. In the 1966 edition of the *Europa Year Book* the figure was replaced by the statement: "The population of France is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic" (p. 525).

may be widespread enough to be considered significant is Judaism. However, it could be argued effectively that although the Jewish religion is significantly different from that of the Christian doctrine, the two are not incompatible. Even in the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy, the vehemence of opposition has lessened greatly. The recent liberalization of both Catholic and Protestant thought has probably brought these two aspects of Christianity closer together than they have ever been since Martin Luther split the movement apart.

Beside the common religious ideology, there is some broad consensus on general political principles which may be considered as a second major value. Although there are some differences in the political structures of the participating units, all have generally endorsed the concept of democracy which can be defined as "a political system in which the opportunity to participate in decisions is widely shared among all adult citizens."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1964), 8.

The republican governments of West Germany and Italy may be viewed with some scepticism when proffered as examples of this main value. However, it is felt that the experience of the past thirty or more years—the complete devastation of both countries as a consequence of their experience with nazism and fascism and the present period of great economic gain under more democratic regimes—has had its effect. Writers on this question show some guarded optimism. Heidenheimer suggests that “although democracy is still understood in varying ways . . . there is no doubt that [German] leaders and chief instruments are sincere and single-minded in their commitment to the values of the Constitution.”<sup>5</sup> Public opinion surveys seemed to show a similar trend. The results of a questionnaire that asked which government was considered best for Germany showed that “Over half chose democracy in 1953, and by 1956 the proportion had risen to over two-thirds. During the same period, those favoring monarchy or “an authoritarian regime” dropped from one in five to slightly more than one in ten.”<sup>6</sup>

The case of Italy is similar. Although a difference between the northern and the southern regions is quite evident, it is more noticeable in the cultural and economic spheres than in the political. Since the *Risorgimento* of 1859–60, perhaps with the exception of the fascist period, the liberal democratic principles have been upheld as a value by a major portion of the population.

The heritage of Roman law, which is related to the political ideology by being one of its founding principles, should be considered as a main value because of its significance and long historical duration. The six nations of Western Europe here considered all base their present legal systems on these principles. Richard C. Mayne explains its importance: “Roman Law . . . left with the peoples it touched most deeply both a preference for starting from stated principles and a bent for codified legislation that contrasts with the more empirical procedures of Anglo-Saxon case-law.”<sup>7</sup>

A fourth main value which all participating units seem to possess, although some to a greater extent than others, is the value of economic individualism: “In the model of economic individualism there is no central authority with power to make the essential decisions. Economic activity is guided, rather, by a multitude of individual decisions, each of them limited in scope, these decisions being coordinated through the process of buying and selling in free markets.”<sup>8</sup> It may be argued that this model does not exactly fit any of the nation-states in question. Although the economies of all participating units practise some aspects of state intervention, intervention is tolerated only as a necessary evil, not as a major value.

#### MUTUAL RESPONSIVENESS

In this category Deutsch places the feelings of “mutual sympathy and loyalties—of ‘we-feeling,’ trust, and consideration—” and he also suggests that there should be “at least partial identification in terms of self-images and interests”; finally,

<sup>5</sup>Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany*, 2d ed. rev. (New York, 1966), 238.

<sup>6</sup>W. Phillips Davison, “Trends in West German Public Opinion, 1946–1956,” in Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, eds., *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Evanston, Ill., 1957), 297.

<sup>7</sup>*The Community of Europe* (New York, 1963), 46.

<sup>8</sup>Clair Wilcox *et al.*, *Economics of the World Today* (New York, 1962), 5.

it should include the "ability to predict each other's behavior and ability to act in accordance with that prediction."<sup>9</sup>

The present international institutions of these six nations have undoubtedly helped to create a certain sense of loyalty and "we-feeling." This is particularly true of the Common Market. Public opinion polls conducted in France and Germany prior to the initiation of EEC show only slight acceptance of a European idea. A poll conducted in Germany in 1956 showed that only 34 per cent of those interviewed believed in the possibility of a united Western Europe. A poll in France in 1954 shows somewhat the same attitude. Although it was directed to the more limited notion of the European Defence Community (EDC) it may be considered to reflect a general indication of opinion toward the broader idea of United Europe. The poll showed that 36 per cent of those interviewed were "for or rather for" EDC, 31 per cent "against or rather against," and 33 per cent had no opinion.<sup>10</sup> A summary of the general attitude in France during the years 1954–57 suggests that "European union is perhaps a distant vision. . . . As we have seen [through public opinion data], the realization of this union has never emerged as the most urgent or most important goal which the [French] government had to face."<sup>11</sup> Although the connection between the creation of new economic institutions which went into effect in January 1958 and the increased awareness and approval of the idea of Europe is not strong enough to indicate a direct cause-and-effect relationship, the differences in attitude that have occurred since that time are striking. A poll conducted in Germany in late 1958 shows a definite change. Of those interviewed on the question of approval or disapproval of the idea of a united Europe, 75 per cent considered themselves in favour of this idea.<sup>12</sup>

An indication of how the general public of Italy and the Benelux countries felt was not evident until 1962. At this time an extensive poll, conducted for the European Community's Information Service by Gallup International, shows an impressive increase in the allegiance toward a unified Europe. The poll, conducted simultaneously in all six nations during the months of February and March, interviewed a representative sample of 6334 people. On the question of the degree of consensus on the idea of a united Europe, the information shown in Figure 1 was compiled.

The generally widespread support for the idea of a united Europe is evident. The amount of concrete interest created by this generally felt attitude toward the idea of "Europe" should not be overestimated. The 1962 study reports that, although there is such sympathy, "a large section of opinion does not question the judgment it has made and is only moderately interested in how matters develop from day to day." An average of only 36 per cent of those interviewed thought often or very often about European unification.<sup>13</sup>

This general lack of interest for more particular information was also brought

<sup>9</sup>Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, p. 129.

<sup>10</sup>Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1962), 58.

<sup>11</sup>Charles G. McClintock and Dale J. Hekhuis, "European Deterrence: Its Organization, Utility, and Political Feasibility," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V (Sept. 1961), 242–3.

<sup>12</sup>Hans A. Schmitt, *The Path to European Union* (Baton Rouge, La., 1962), 236.

<sup>13</sup>Gallup International. *L'opinion publique et l'Europe des Six* (L'Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique, 1962), 7, translation mine.




FIGURE 1. Supporters and opponents of a united Europe\*

out by a public opinion survey which was conducted a year later. Basically a market survey of the six nations here in question plus Great Britain, it also included some general questions on attitudes toward the Common Market. Of those interviewed, 79 per cent had heard of the Common Market, but only 28 per cent could name all member nations correctly, and 14 per cent could not name any of them.<sup>14</sup> This survey, conducted for the Reader's Digest International by six independent research institutes, was an interview survey of a representative sample, 10,500 of which came from within the EEC countries.

Recent polls conducted in Germany and France are more difficult to analyse. In France a study, conducted by the Institut français d'Opinion publique in June 1965, showed that 78 per cent of those questioned favoured a European community. The affirmative opinion was broken down into those in favour of a federated structure (38 per cent), those in favour of a Europe of states (30 per cent), and those who did not specify (32 per cent). In answer to a question regarding the delegation of power "to an authority for diplomacy and defense," 42 per cent were in favour and only 18 per cent were opposed.<sup>15</sup> In a survey completed in February 1966 by the same institute on the latter question the affirmative response increased to 55 per cent but those opposed to this central authority had risen to 22 per cent. And in the 1966 poll conducted by the *Institut für Demoskopie* at the end of 1965, only 29 per cent of those asked were willing

\*Gallup International, *L'opinion publique et l'Europe des Six* (L'Institut français d'Opinion publique, 1962), 4.

<sup>14</sup>The *European Common Market and Britain*. The Reader's Digest Association, 1963. 41.

<sup>15</sup>"Europe and the French Voter," *Common Market*, VI (March 1966), 55.

to predict that a United States of Europe would come into being. Yet, when they were asked whether "European integration was making progress," 44 per cent agreed and 24 per cent felt that there was a return to nationalism.<sup>16</sup>

An interesting aspect of the Reader's Digest questionnaire, and one that helps to elaborate the third point of Deutsch—the predicting of the behaviour of others and ability to act on those predictions—is the national characteristics attributed to fellow nationals as well as to others within the community. From a list of fourteen characteristics, nationals were asked to choose those which best fitted their own nation and those best describing the other nationals of the Common Market. With only a few exceptions the characteristics picked showed a striking similarity between the self-descriptions and the descriptions of others.

#### CORE AREAS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES

Development of a strong core area within the community was found to aid integration and community development. Deutsch found this to be particularly true if this area has certain capabilities: (1) capability to act because of size, power and administrative ability; and (2) the ability to relate to the other units.

A core area might be developing within the Community. The facts of size, power, economic strength, and administrative efficiency cannot be disputed, but the responsiveness of this area toward the other participating units is less certain. The French-German rapprochement, officially beginning with the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community and culminating in the treaty of political and economic co-operation between the two governments in 1963, has been watched by the other member states with some misgivings. Although no two nations can officially usurp the power from the nationally represented Council of Ministers, the real power of the two largest and most influential members working in close harmony can be viewed as a definite threat to the other members of the Community. There are, as yet, few indications that this rapprochement will be utilized to usurp power within the Community. The change in leadership of the German Federal Republic from Adenauer to Erhard seems to have brought about some change in that nation's attitude toward any such hegemony. In talks between Erhard and De Gaulle in Bonn, Erhard rejected De Gaulle's proposal to set up a Franco-German committee to prepare for further steps toward European integration. When this position was challenged by "Gaullist" elements of his own party as being anti-European, Erhard replied that one must have the courage to resist a superficial solution "which does not serve the common interest," and "which does not serve to unite us but to divide us."<sup>17</sup>

The change of leadership which made Kurt Kiesinger chancellor in December 1966 reinstated the concept of Franco-German co-operation. In this first policy speech before the Bundestag Kiesinger stated a willingness to work closely with France: "The German-French cooperation we desire is directed against no other nation. It is far rather the crystallization point of a policy whose aim is the unification of Europe. It is indispensable if Europe is to be a partner worthy of

<sup>16</sup>European Community Information Service, *European Community*, 92 (Washington, D.C., May 1966), 9.

<sup>17</sup>*New York Times*, July 10, 1964.



sharing responsibility.”<sup>18</sup> A few days later, in a TV interview he spoke of German “efforts to bring about with France a core of European unity.”<sup>19</sup>

A second core area that is beginning to develop is in direct opposition to the Franco-Germany hegemony. Although not strictly a geographically based core, it is none the less a force in the community and, more importantly, a counter force to the De Gaulle–Adenauer idea of a *Europe des patries*. This core consists of the leaders of the community-wide institutions and their national supporters. The aims of these two opposing potential core areas can best be distinguished through their respective positions on the political future of the communities. The position of those forces which wish to promote a strong, centrally organized federation of European nations is best expressed by Walter Hallstein. Professor Hallstein, former President of the Commission of the Common Market, is often considered to be one of the leaders of this newly emerging force. In a speech at Columbia University (March 2, 1963) he stated that position very clearly: “The Community is the very negation of hegemony, of domination by a single power, or indeed of any form of nationalist politics. The constitution of the Community, indeed, is the organized and methodical rebuttal of hegemony: it is the contradiction of the old system of coalitions used as the instrument of national policy.”<sup>20</sup> The opposing point of view was first formally presented in July 1960 by General De Gaulle during his meeting with Chancellor Adenauer at Rambouillet. It was here that he suggested a “Europe of Fatherlands,” where “member states would not be required to delegate sovereignty to a central authority, and a unanimity rule would in effect give each state a veto.”<sup>21</sup>

Although the lines seem to be drawn, there is some evidence to support the contention that the differences here stated are more accurately differences in time. In 1965, at his twelfth press conference, De Gaulle called for a “community that is fair and reasonable.” After spending some time in explaining the need for prior agreement on economic matters, primarily in the field of agriculture, he stated, “Of course, it is conceivable and desirable for work to start again one day on that great undertaking, the Community. But this will happen, possibly, only after a delay whose extent cannot be foreseen.”<sup>22</sup>

The position that Kurt Kiesinger is taking in this debate is not yet clear. Former Chancellor Erhard preferred “a federally organized Europe in which the various countries and people can live their lives according to their own ideals.”<sup>23</sup> In a speech on January 9, 1964, Erhard emphasized Franco-German co-operation. “There would be no Europe, European policy, European integration or Atlantic partnership without this basis. . . . The Franco-German relationship should not be exclusive . . . but gather Europe together.”<sup>24</sup>

The two core areas discussed are possible examples of what Deutsch was

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1966.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1966.

<sup>20</sup>*Bulletin from the European Community*, 61 (March 1963), 4.

<sup>21</sup>Richard L. Worsnop, “Political Integration of Europe,” *Editorial Research Report*, II (Sept. 19, 1962), 676.

<sup>22</sup>Ambassade de France au Canada, *Speeches and Press Conferences*, 228 (Sept. 9, 1965).

<sup>23</sup>“Erhard versus Centralism,” *Economist*, 205 (Dec. 1, 1962), 897.

<sup>24</sup>*European Community* 69 (Feb.-March 1964), 6.

looking for within a community. In the case of the Six, however, it seems more likely that the nations may be developing into so tightly integrated a community that no core area is either possible or necessary. What does seem to be developing is a core area comprising all six nations of the European Community which may well serve as a core area for a more loosely constructed larger community of all of Western Europe. This community may perhaps already be developing under the institutional framework of the Council of Europe which is composed of seventeen Western European nations (including the Six).

#### DISTINCTIVE WAY OF LIFE

Under this heading Deutsch placed networks of major and minor values which were accepted and institutionalized by the area. Deutsch determined the distinctiveness of these networks of values and institutions according to two criteria: (1) distinctive as a contrast to other areas, and (2) distinctiveness in comparison to the recent past in the *same* area.

The point of geographic differentiation is difficult to establish. Although Western Europe has certainly developed a related way of life, which is distinguishable from neighbouring areas, Western Europe cannot be limited to the area comprising the six nations of the European Community. Here again, there is an indication that the European Community may be larger than the area now under investigation. The way of life in this area is little different from that of nations such as Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, or even Great Britain. Drew Middleton helps to illustrate this fact in an article on the impact of industrialization on northern France. In his words this area of France is "a proud expression of French progress," as well as being "an example of the internationalism that pervades great industrial areas." In a comparison of northern France with industrial sections of Britain and Germany, Middleton describes the striking similarities that seem to exist in these areas:

. . . dingy streets with their dowdy houses differ little from those in Gelsenkirchen or Bolton.

Even the new housing developments seem curiously like those in Britain's new towns or the blocks of apartments rising along the borders of the Ruhr. A German or British worker would be hard put to find differences aside from the names of stores.

He would see the same sort of buildings, the same sort of cars, even the same movies showing at the neighborhood theaters. . . .<sup>25</sup>

The second criterion of distinctiveness, that of comparison to the recent past in the same area, has greater applicability. The general change in attitudes of the public since the formation of the institutions of EEC and Euratom is certainly significant enough to be considered as evidence of a change in the network of major and minor values. More specifically, the change can be seen in the greater degree of industrialization and consequent urbanization. Middleton's article just quoted is relevant to this phenomenon as well. Not only are these regions becoming more alike, but they are also becoming more dissimilar to their own recent past. The shift from agriculture to industry and to the services that accompany industrialization is quite evident. Out of a total of 72.4 million employed in the

<sup>25</sup>"The Economy in Northern France Is Booming," *New York Times*, Dec. 12, 1963, 2.

Six in 1962, 19.5 per cent were engaged in agricultural work, 37.4 per cent in services, and 43.1 per cent in industry. This shows a definite shift to industrialization, when compared to the 1958 statistics of: agriculture 22.7 per cent, services 35.3 per cent, and industry 42.0 per cent.<sup>26</sup>

#### SUPERIOR ECONOMIC GROWTH

One of the most publicized aspects of the European communities has been their spectacular economic growth. This is true both in comparison to neighbouring areas and in comparison to the recent past of its own area. Statistically, the economic growth of the European Community has been greater than any other bloc of comparable size or importance. For the period January 1958 to December 1961, the real gross national product of the Community increased by 21.5 per cent; the industrial production increased by nearly 29 per cent. This becomes more impressive when these rates are compared to those of the United Kingdom and the United States for the same period. The gross national product increase was 11.6 per cent for the UK and 10 per cent for the US, while the increase in industrial production in the UK amounted to 13 per cent and in the US to a little more than 18 per cent.<sup>27</sup> Since 1961 this rate of increasing prosperity in the Community has slowed down, owing in part to insufficient labour. However, the increases have continued: the average annual increase in real GNP from 1961 to 1968 has been 4.1 per cent, and the increase for 1968 is estimated at 4.5 per cent.

#### EXPECTATIONS OF JOINT ECONOMIC REWARD

Although this condition is closely related to superior economic growth, there is an important difference in point of view. While superior economic growth may not be directly related to any wilful implementation of policy toward the creation of a larger political entity, expectation of economic reward in such an entity implies a willingness to act. In other words, while the former may merely be a condition helpful toward integration, the latter is an attitude of willingness to act in order to reap the rewards of such a process.

The measure of expectation of the members, national decision-makers as well as the general public, that *joint* action will reap economic reward is difficult to determine. The best indicator of this expectation would be the actions and attitudes of the actors. At the national level it seems fairly clear that there is a high degree of consensus that economic rewards are best attained in a joint program. The very fact that the three organizations of the area (EEC, ECSC, and Euratom) are economic in orientation seems to substantiate this belief in the advantage of common economic action. A further indication of this consensus is the agreement to speed up the original timetable of complete economic integration. At the present rate of development the goal of a European common market for all goods and services was expected to be achieved during 1968. This date was 1½ years ahead of the schedule originally planned in the Rome Treaty. The

<sup>26</sup>*European Community*, 66 (Oct. 1963), 13.

<sup>27</sup>All statistics in this section, unless otherwise noted, are taken from European Community Information Service, *A New World Power: European Community's Mounting Economic Strength* (1962), as well as various issues of *Common Market*.

very fact that the nations of this area still believe that their economic goals are best served by joint action, although political policies may differ, is also an indication of their faith in this joint action. When France rejected the British application for membership to the Common Market in January 1963, there were many who predicted an end to further integration efforts, including economic ones.

Although initiatives toward greater political integration were stopped for a time, economic co-operation increased. By the end of that year the six representatives of the Council of Ministers of EEC had agreed on important measures to bring about a common market for agriculture to complement the existing one in industry and commerce. Similarly, the crisis in 1965 was primarily one of differing views on the extent of political integration allowable at this time. It was felt, particularly by France, that economic integration should take priority over political considerations. In regard to this, on March 25, 1965, M. Couve de Murville stated in addressing the French legislature that political considerations could be discussed "as soon as the important debates in progress in Brussels, especially those on agriculture, would reach a satisfactory conclusion."<sup>28</sup>

In light of the political disappointments at the beginning of 1963 and in July 1965, the agreements reached to end the stalemate seem to indicate that the potential for further economic rewards outweigh traditional political rivalries.

Expectations of economic reward can also be detected in the attitude of the general public of the Six. The overall acceptance of a unified Europe has already been shown. Public opinion studies also show that by far the most often mentioned advantage of the economic community to their own country is the lowering of economic barriers between nations. Other economic aspects of the communities also ranked high, but so did those not economic in nature. Table II shows the general attitude of the population toward nine proposals for future development of EEC. Although there are some differences in the results of the two polls, none of them shows a significant change in the attitude of those opposed to them. On eight of the nine proposals, the percentage "for" has been reduced by an average of 7.7 per cent while that against has changed very little.

#### WIDE RANGE OF MUTUAL TRANSACTIONS

Deutsch feels that successful integration requires a number of different institutions and organizations to carry out a fairly wide variety of common functions and services. Some of the common functions and services have already been mentioned in previous points. The free flow of goods and services within the community is both mutual and balanced. The common organizations and institutions to carry out these transactions were, until recently, under the direction of the Commission of EEC and Euratom, and the High Authority of ECSC.

During the first ten years of its operation (1952–62), ECSC has abolished measures which tended to limit the transactions between the participating units. It has eliminated customs duties, quotas, and transportation differentials on the movement of coal, steel, iron ore, and scrap within the community.

Euratom has played a similar role in creating a common market for nuclear materials and equipment. It has also "put into force a plan for the free movement of qualified atomic workers," provided insurance coverage for these workers, and

<sup>28</sup>Ambassade de France, *Service de Presse et d'Information*, HS-274 (March 1965), 5.

TABLE II  
ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENT

Proposals	Average percentage of the six nations			
	1962*		1963†	
	for	against	for	against
1. Elimination of customs duties	81	6	72	5
2. Aid for poorer EEC countries from better-off members	49	28	53	20
3. Single foreign policy for all member countries	60	9	54	10
4. Common agricultural policy	69	8	56	8
5. Free movement of labor	68	16	62	13
6. Investment in Asian and African countries	35	40	33	35
7. Scientific research pool	75	3	64	5
8. Equal social benefits for all EEC member countries	77	4	70	4
9. Equal professional and diploma qualifications	72	4	64	6

\**L'opinion publique et l'Europe des Six*, 23-4.

†*The European Common Market and Britain*, 42.

set up an information centre "to provide information on the rapidly increasing uses of isotopes in industry."<sup>29</sup>

Free movement of labour for all sectors of the economy was not initiated until 1961. In August 1961, the Commission of EEC issued its regulation No. 15. This regulation provided for: (1) the admission and employment of the worker, (2) the admission of his family under certain conditions, and (3) an advisory committee to supervise the implementation of these regulations. This committee is composed of 36 members: two from each country representing the employers, two representing labour, and two representing each government. This regulation was revised in 1964 in order to give more liberal coverage for a wider range of labour and less preferential treatment to the national labour market.<sup>30</sup>

After a long debate the Council of Ministers of EEC finally agreed on a common transport policy for an initial six-year trial period. The first stage of this policy began on January 1, 1967. This affects only cross-national trade between members of the community. The second stage will cover all transport within the community and is to start operating on January 1, 1970.<sup>31</sup> Other common institutions such as the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Committee, and many others are well enough known not to need elaboration here.

Although not restricted to the six nations of the European Community, the functions and services of the Council of Europe are common to all of them. Institutions such as the European Commission on Human Rights and the Council for Cultural Co-operation should be included in any discussion of mutual transactions. The former organization is helping to build and codify international laws

<sup>29</sup>European Information Service, *The Facts* (Brussels, Luxembourg, Sept. 1962).

<sup>30</sup>*Common Market*, IV (May 1964), 96.

<sup>31</sup>*European Community*, 88 (Dec. 1965-Jan. 1966), 12-13.

which guarantee the rights of the individual, while the latter provides a means for the exchange of artistic and educational information between the members.

#### LINKS OF SOCIAL COMMUNICATION

Deutsch here refers to the links of social communication between the political organizations and the politically relevant strata within them. These links, to be effective, must be both horizontal and vertical, involving persons as well as organizations.

Television is rapidly becoming an influential link of public communication in Western Europe. In the 1962 opinion survey previously mentioned, almost all of the households which had television reported that they had received their information on current problems on the European Community from this medium. The Reader's Digest survey showed that although only 34 per cent of all the families in the Six own sets, 71 per cent of these have obtained one for the first time since 1958. Evidently aware of this increased use of television as an information medium, the European communities planned a new television series which began in September 1963. In this monthly series each program was sponsored and produced by one of the participating units. The establishment of a "well-equipped studio" for television and radio has made it possible to reach many citizens of the Community. This studio, inaugurated in November 1965, is operated by the Joint Press and Information Service of the European Communities.<sup>32</sup>

For those homes in which the television set has not as yet been incorporated, it is estimated that news about European events is learned about equally from newspapers and radio. The ownership of radios and the habit of reading newspapers is also fairly evenly distributed. According to the Reader's Digest survey in 1963, 78 per cent of the European households owned and used radios, and 72 per cent read newspapers at least three times per week.

Education is becoming another important social link of communication, both vertically (from organizations to the general public) and horizontally (across geographic boundaries). European schools have already been established at Bergen (the Netherlands), Luxembourg, Varese (Italy), Karlsruhe (Germany), and Mol and Brussels (Belgium). These schools were principally developed to educate the children of the employees of the communities, but are open to others who may wish their children to enter. Children in these schools learn European history in their "second language," a language they are required to add to their own; this helps to give them a better perspective on nationally oriented textbooks. These schools, beginning with less than a hundred students in 1954, have grown to a total enrolment of over six thousand.<sup>33</sup>

Although plans for parallel development in the higher educational institutions have been made, there is as yet little indication of when these plans will be carried out. The project to develop a European university was originally assigned to the Commission of Euratom. The actual planning was delegated to the Italian government in the Bonn Declaration (July 1961). This declaration recommended the "creation by Italy of a European University in Florence, to the intellectual life

<sup>32</sup>EEC Commission, *8th General Report*, June 1965, 392-3.

<sup>33</sup>*European Community*, 111 (April 1968), 22.

and financing of which the Six governments will contribute.”<sup>34</sup> Tentative plans called for a two-year program of study at the postgraduate level, which was to begin sometime in 1965, leading to a doctoral award recognized by all participating states.<sup>35</sup> So far this has not materialized.

Political parties are performing the dual function of continued social communication between the parties and their members nationally, and communication at the party level between national representatives. The seating of delegates to the European Parliament according to political groupings, rather than according to national representation, must be considered as one of the factors that help to create this dual role for the political organizations.

Until 1965 there were three such parliamentary groups. They represented the Socialists (33 members), the Christian Democrats (67 members), and the Liberals (41 members).<sup>36</sup> Although the Socialists were the smallest group represented they seemed to be the most committed to European integration.

Unlike the Socialists, the other two original political groups were not able to develop a common set of principles. The Christian Democratic group were generally united in the belief in the need for European unity. However, the opinions began to differ over actual methods of implementation. The Liberals, composed primarily of French delegates from the right and centre parties, were a much more heterogeneous group. Consideration of national aims over those of the Community were more frequent.<sup>37</sup> A change of parliamentary rules which lowered the minimum size of these political groups led to the formation of a fourth political group. This group, composed of 15 French Gaullists, sits under the title of the European Democratic Union. According to the latest figures available, the European Parliament is now composed of 61 Christian Democrats, 35 Socialists, 26 Liberals, and 15 members of EDU.<sup>38</sup>

A fourth group of organizations of particular significance as social links of communication, has been the increasing number of non-governmental organizations which have sprung up in order to represent local socioeconomic interests to the executives of the three communities. Two major organizations in this category are the *Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne* (UNICE) and the *Comité des Organisations professionnelles agricoles de la CEE* (COPA). UNICE is an organization “made up of the peak industrial confederations in each Country for the purpose of creating, maintaining, and developing the spirit and the bonds of solidarity; to stimulate the working out of an industrial policy in a European spirit.”<sup>39</sup> COPA is a similar organization which has grown in importance since the recently implemented common agricultural policy of EEC. Established in 1959, this affiliation of agricultural interest groups has grown from approximately forty organizations to more than double that number. These organizations are only two

<sup>34</sup>J. R. Lambert, “The European University: A European Community Project,” *World Today*, XVIII (Feb. 1962), 82.

<sup>35</sup>*European Community*, 73 (July 1964), 7.

<sup>36</sup>Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, Calif., 1963), 4.

<sup>37</sup>Kenneth Lindsay, *European Assemblies* (London, 1960), 244–7.

<sup>38</sup>W. H. Clark, *The Politics of the Common Market* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967), 98.

<sup>39</sup>Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics*, 100.

examples of a much larger process. Lindberg describes this process: "Thousands of interest-group leaders . . . are getting to know each other, are often engaged in a process of trying to reach a compromise. . . . A regional interest-group bureaucracy is being created."<sup>40</sup>

The Action Committee for a United States of Europe is also an interest group, but should be considered to represent more general interests than those mentioned above. Jean Monnet formed this group in 1955 after resigning his position as chairman of the High Authority of ECSC. He described the Action Committee as a political pressure group and "as a kind of 'Committee of Correspondence' of the Six in which political and trade union leaders would together chart the course of action to be taken."<sup>41</sup>

#### BROADENING OF ELITES

This phenomenon is considered important by Deutsch as an indicator of integration and is defined as the broadening of the elite in the socioeconomic and political field, in its recruitment from broader social strata as well as in its continuing connections with them. There are conflicting reports as to what economic and social strata are supporting "Europeanization." Karl Loewenstein suggests that this support is manifested primarily by intellectuals, big business, and industry. "Small business has little to gain," and organized labour is "lukewarm to economic integration and openly hostile toward its political implications."<sup>42</sup> This is fairly well substantiated by the 1963 public opinion survey. The socio-professional breakdown of those who felt that, for their country, the Common Market was more of an advantage, shows that 67 per cent of the industrialists and professionals answered in the affirmative. In the middle class and self-employed artisan class the support dropped to 48 per cent, while among the skilled workers and foremen only 42 per cent felt an advantage.

The European Trade-Union Secretariat can be considered an example of a new elite, drawn from the ranks of labour. The Secretariat was established in 1958 at Brussels in co-ordination with creation of the EEC. Its function is to represent labour unions' interests to the European executives of the three communities. The secretary general, Mr. Buiters, states that "since the beginning of the Schuman Plan negotiations, the labor unions in the six Community countries have actively supported European Integration."<sup>43</sup> One explanation for these two opposing views on the attitude of labour may be that the labour union elite are for integration while the rank-and-file workers are less enthusiastic for fear of competition from low-wage labour. Labour union leaders also have official recognition and specific functions as members of the Economic and Social Committee for EEC and Euratom. Thirty-three out of the total of 101 members are labour unionists.

The new class of international civil servants may be an important source for a new elite, recruited from a different social stratum. These European officials are increasing both in number and influence. There are now more than 4000 community employees, approximately 1000 in ECSC, 500 in Euratom, and 2500 in

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>41</sup>Max Kohnstamm, "The European Tide," *Daedalus* (winter 1964), 94.

<sup>42</sup>"Unification of Europe: A Balance Sheet," *Current History*, XL (Jan. 1961), 8.

<sup>43</sup>*European Community*, 71 (May 1964), 8.



EEC.<sup>44</sup> The *Economist* named them “the Eurocrats” and praised their “dynamism,” and described them as “multilingual tough-minded Europeans mostly aged around 35–40.”<sup>45</sup> They are therefore old enough to have had some experience of war, but have not been conditioned by national civil service routine and are, for the most part, trained in industry, banking, business, engineering, or academic professions. Mayne believes that “the sense of belonging to a single entity is undoubtedly real among the ‘Eurocrats,’ and even among their colleagues in the national services. Partly, it arises from the fact of their meeting in innumerable—some would say interminable—expert committees, whose members gradually come to form a kind of European ‘grapevine,’ along which gossip and information and influence flow more and more.”<sup>46</sup>

#### GREATER MOBILITY OF PERSONS

According to Deutsch, the importance of this mobility must be measured in two ways: (1) the actual degree of mobility permitted among the participating units, and (2) the attitude of the general public to this idea.

The treaty which established EEC made some general but clear provisions for the promotion and actual establishment of complete freedom of movement of nationals of the participating member states within the territory of the community. Article 52 of the Treaty states: “Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be progressively abolished in the course of the transitional period.” The free movement of labour within the communities has already been discussed under another heading. However, the treaty also stated that “freedom of establishment shall include the right to engage in and carry on non-wage-earning activities.” Although some moves in this direction have already been accomplished, they had been completed prior to establishment of the Rome treaties. European nationals need no longer obtain visas for travel between European nations. This requirement was abolished in 1956 through the efforts of the Council of Europe. A recommendation to permit the use of a standard identity card instead of passports was made by the Organization of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in April of 1957.<sup>47</sup> Regardless of their origin, however, it is a fact that both measures have been adopted by all the participating units of the Communities. The only restriction now made on the free movement of persons (other than that already discussed under labour) is the need of an identity card.<sup>48</sup>

The attitude of the general public toward this increased mobility is difficult to assess. They have a generally favourable attitude, according to actual practice. In the Reader’s Digest 1963 market survey, 24 per cent of those interviewed had travelled to another country in the last three years, while only a total of 37 per cent had travelled since the end of the war. Expectation of future travel showed

<sup>44</sup>*The Community of Europe*, 24, and Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics*, 325.

<sup>45</sup>“The Eurocrats,” *Economist*, 200 (July 28, 1961), 449.

<sup>46</sup>Mayne, *The Community of Europe*, 25.

<sup>47</sup>United Nations Human Rights Commission, *Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave Any Country Including His Own, and To Return to His Country* (New York, 1963), 7.

<sup>48</sup>OECD Tourism Committee, *Tourism in OECD Member Countries* (Paris, 1962), 52.

that 18 per cent of those interviewed expected to travel abroad within the next twelve months. A breakdown of those who had travelled within the last three years showed that they tended to be the leaders in business, industry, and the professions.

#### RELUCTANCE TO WAGE "FRATRICIDAL" WAR

The possibility of war between the participating units is quite unlikely. Aside from membership in the same economic organizations, all are also members of the fifteen-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization and therefore militarily committed to aid each other in case of an attack by an outside force. Germany, once feared as a potential enemy by the rest of Western Europe, is now considered a staunch ally of "Western principles." It is generally understood that France wanted European unification as a solution to the threat of the renewed political, economic, and military power of the German Federal Republic. The creation of the three economic organizations has certainly helped to eliminate this potential threat.

#### OUTSIDE MILITARY THREAT

Deutsch suggests that, although foreign military threats may have had an initial effect toward integration, these effects are only temporary. There is some evidence to support the allegation that the communist threat was one of the factors that created ECSC in 1951. Most sources, however, are agreed that the French initiative in 1951 was timed to respond to a politically and economically revitalized West Germany. Some went as far as to suggest that the announcement of the Schuman Plan brought out fears among Western statesmen that the alliance against the Soviet Union might be weakened through this move which would help to isolate Europe from the United States.<sup>49</sup> Whatever the intent or cause of the creation of ECSC, feeling in the Community now is not one of being threatened by an outside military force. President De Gaulle, in his thirteenth press conference stated that because of the "evolution of the countries of the East, the Western world is no longer threatened" and used this argument to support his decision to withdraw his forces from the integrated command of NATO.

#### STRONG ECONOMIC TIES

Economic interdependence between the six nations of the European Community has already been discussed in some detail under the section "superior economic growth." The fact that these nations have strong economic ties is best illustrated by the fact that in the first eight years of EEC's existence, the amount of trade between participating units rose by approximately 168 per cent.

#### ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC ASSIMILATION

Deutsch describes this condition as an association and interrelation of kinship groups as well as common cultural patterns and means of communication which might include a common language.

Political leaders of the participating units have, on different occasions, expressed a certain amount of anxiety that national differences will be suppressed.

<sup>49</sup>"The Schuman Scheme," *Economist*, 158, May 20, 1950, 1106.

Perhaps Nicolas Margue, former Minister of Education in Luxembourg, states the objections most succinctly: "There can be no possible point in trying to iron out the infinite diversity of European thought and culture, to impose a paper uniformity on peoples and countries that have developed individually over the centuries. The European Community must consist first and foremost of the existing states, both large and small."<sup>50</sup>

There are some indications that a certain uniformity in newly emerging social and cultural institutions is being created. The European schools have already been discussed. Although their impact is not yet significant, students of these schools are being taught to be aware of Europe as an entity. The era of affluence (some have called it Americanization) is evidently affecting most of the participating nations. Mayne reports that the number of retail stores has diminished per capita, but that their size has increased. Self-service stores have increased in number from a little more than 3500 in 1957 to 37,000 in 1963.<sup>51</sup> In regard to greater mobility of labour, only 520,000 (out of a working force of over 74,000,000) earned their living in a nation-member of the community other than their own. The reason for this, he suggests, is that "in a Europe still divided by language and custom, old habits die hard, and the mobility of labor remains small."<sup>52</sup> Although the proceedings of the communities are conducted in the four official languages (French, German, Italian, and Dutch), a recent survey of foreign languages spoken in the Community area shows that English is the most frequently known second language. Only 21 per cent of those interviewed spoke any foreign language; of these, 10 per cent named English, 9 per cent German, and 8 per cent French as their second language.<sup>53</sup> The facts seem to indicate that basic cultural values and knowledge of the language of other participating units are not very widely understood or sought for.

#### IV. Conclusion

In this paper, political integration and institutional development have been described as a process, without an end-point, leading to the formation of communities. This process was then identified as one of parallel development. By this is meant that, over a period of time, the amount of integration roughly approximates the state of development of the appropriate institutions. It is naturally understood that, although these two factors of community formation can be separately identified, they interact continuously. It is this interaction that tends to control the extent to which the two forces can be out of balance.

Although new institutional development has been relatively negligible since the creation of EEC and Euratom, the degree of development of political consensus is discernible. When the framework of Deutsch's background conditions is applied to determine the nature and extent of this consensus, the following factors emerge: 1. The eight conditions present in greatly increased amounts were: mutual responsiveness; superior economic growth; expectation of joint economic reward;

<sup>50</sup>"A Small Country Views Europe," *European Community*, 69 (Feb.-March 1964), 13.

<sup>51</sup>Richard Mayne, "Economic Integration in the New Europe," *Daedalus* (winter 1964), 129.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>53</sup>*The European Common Market and Britain*, 48.

mutual transactions; social links of communication; broadening of elites; reluctance to wage "fratricidal" war; and strong economic ties.

2. The four conditions found to be somewhat more prevalent than before were: compatibility of major values; core areas; distinctive way of life; and greater mobility.

3. The two conditions not sufficiently met were: ethnic and linguistic assimilation, and outside military threat.

The problem of the lack of distinctiveness from neighbouring areas, as well as the lack of a sufficiently defined core area, seems to suggest that the European Community may become such a core area for the rest of Western Europe. A merging of most of Western Europe seems highly probable. How soon this may come about is open to speculation. The defeat of Britain's entry into the Community by De Gaulle's veto will delay this merger but cannot block it indefinitely. However, most of the conditions considered essential by Deutsch seem to be present in the area of the Six. The "we-feeling" as well as the network of social, political, and economic interactions can be clearly detected. The economic growth and expectation of future economic reward are so well known that their elaboration here seems almost redundant. Of greatest importance seem to be the number of social links of communication which have been established. While seeking new horizontal channels of communication cross-nationally, these links retain their traditional or vertical channels within the nation. The creation of a new elite seems to be closely connected with this network of social communication. One helps to reinforce the other.

If one accepts these conditions as an indication of general consensus, then one must infer that the conditions have been sufficiently met to conclude that political and socioeconomic integration, or a general consensus of the public, has developed adequately to support further political institutions in the near future.

The relevance of Deutsch's scheme of analysis to the determination of the degree of general consensus is difficult to assess. In this paper these conditions were used as a framework of analysis to facilitate the gathering of data. As an organizing scheme, Deutsch's fourteen points have the advantage of dealing with qualitative aspects as well as quantitative ones. Quantitatively, twelve of the fourteen conditions appear to be present. However, integration toward the formation of an international community cannot be measured by mere quantification of data. A study of relevant variables must also involve qualitative distinctions. The application of these fourteen conditions to Western Europe suggests that some of the conditions do seem to be more important than others. Further, it seems that some may serve as a basis or precondition for others. With this revision in mind the following evaluation emerges:

- I. Conditions necessary at least at a low level before others begin to develop significantly:
  - mutual responsiveness
  - expectation of joint economic reward
  - reluctance to wage "fratricidal" war
  - compatibility of major values
  - distinctive way of life
  - core areas

## II. Secondary conditions:

- mutual transactions
- social links of communication
- broadening of elites
- strong economic ties leading to superior economic growth
- greater mobility
- ethnic and linguistic assimilation

It would seem that the preconditions must be present as background for the fulfilment of the secondary ones which in turn lead to further reinforcement of the preconditions. Once the preconditions have been sufficiently met, those conditions which show evidence of cross-national transactions and cross-cultural and social identification take on primary importance. As shown above, the variable of superior economic growth has been linked with the economic ties; one would be insignificant without the other. The only variable or condition not considered applicable here is that of outside military threat. However, were this to be changed to outside economic threat, it would become highly relevant and might be classified as a precondition. In general, with some slight reformulation, Deutsch's scheme can be considered highly useful as a framework of analysis to discover to what extent international integration may be taking place.