



Europeanization

Author(s): John Borneman and Nick Fowler

Source: *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 26 (1997), pp. 487-514

Published by: Annual Reviews

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952532>

Accessed: 01/03/2010 19:19

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Annual Review of Anthropology*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

EUROPEANIZATION

John Borneman and Nick Fowler

Department of Anthropology, McGraw 203, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
14853

KEY WORDS: European Union, tourism, sex, language, money, sport, nation-state

ABSTRACT

As a strategy of self-representation and a device of power, Europeanization is fundamentally reorganizing territoriality and peoplehood, the two principles of group identification that have shaped modern European order. It is the result of a new level and intensity of integration that has been a reaction to the destruction of this century's first and second world wars and the collapse of the cold-war division of Europe into an East and West. Driven above all by the organizational and administrative power of the European Union (EU), Europeanization is still distinct from the EU. Neither Europeanization nor the EU will replace the nation-state, which, for now, remains a superior form for organizing democratic participation and territoriality. Nonetheless, they will likely force states to yield some questions of sovereignty—above all, military, political, and economic—to the EU or other transnational bodies. Nations are now being brought into new relations with each other, creating new alliances and enmities, and are even recreating themselves. The authors explore five domains of practice where the process of Europeanization might be fruitfully studied: language, money, tourism, sex, and sport. They suggest dealing with the EU as a continental political unit of a novel order and with Europeanization pragmatically as both a vision and a process.

INTRODUCTION

The people in Europe currently identify with 32 different European nations and speak 67 languages (not counting dialects). They have created a European currency (the Euro), flag, and newspaper (the *European*); European television

stations (the English SKY, the French-German Arté) and universities; a European Champions League for soccer, film festival, parliament, court, and law; and a “Eurovision” song festival. A few items, such as languages, have been around a long time, but most others on this partial list are less than a century old. These new things are the result of a new level and intensity of integration that has been a reaction to the destruction of this century’s first and second world wars. The two hot wars were followed by the cold-war vision of a Europe formally divided by two “secular spirits” into an East and West. In addition, this cold-war vision is now increasingly seen as an interregnum, a disturbance, and perhaps an amalgam of wounds, but ultimately as a suspension of the Real. For some of these peoples, the Real is Europe before World War I, a continent consisting primarily of competing national interests, without the internal divisions wrought by international working-class movements. For others, there is a sense in which the Real itself is now haunted by a spirit yet to take form. The relatively positive specter of an Americanization of Europe and the negative specter of a Sovietization of Europe are being replaced by the anxiety of a Europeanization. But how can Europe become more European?

For reasons both external and internal to Europe, Europeanization is now an accelerated process and a set of effects that are redefining forms of identification with territory and people. Externally, Europeanization is spurred on by the end of a post-World War II continental triangulation, where “Europe” stood between the United States and the Soviet Union—the two Superpowers, as they were known—who picked over its corpse and fought to interpret its precious and infamous past and to determine the conditions of its resurrection. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the decline in US dominance, Europe has entered adolescence, cut loose for resignification. With no imminent invaders, no New World, no colonies, no occupiers against whom it can take shape, the “mirror of man” has been turned back on itself. It can and it must now define itself. Among the most alluring alterity with which it flirts is that ancient phantasm, the Orient, marked by an anxiety over the politically and religiously explosive Middle East and rivalry with the economic juggernauts in East, South, and Southeast Asia. Both of these Oriental phantasms are, of course, already embodied within Europe by persons, ideologies, images, and material goods from those other geographies.

Internally, Europeanization is linked foremost to the organizational and administrative power of the European Union (EU). Always seen as a means to realize some ill-defined community, the EU is increasingly an end in itself. However, this circularity—the EU as both cause and effect of itself—begs the fundamental question of what it in fact is. Notwithstanding the quite limited, primarily economic goals of its 1951 predecessor—the six-country Monta Union, a “Coal and Steel Community”—the EU is now a set of explosive and in-

determinate effects of late-twentieth-century social and political processes. These effects are fundamentally reorganizing territoriality and peoplehood, the two principles that have shaped modern European order.

Today, the EU works simultaneously to solidify and subsidize processes of discrete nation-making and to enforce pan-European standards on disparate parts. Both directions solicit compliance and provoke reaction, depending on the location of the actor. For example, the EU invokes the principle of territoriality both to strengthen the ability of sovereign nation-states to organize space and to create a larger sphere of European space free of some of the costly national welfare state provisions as counterweight to Japan and North America. The EU also invokes the principle of peoplehood to direct historical memories from both national and continental perspectives. Given recent innovations in the speed and means of communication and the globalization of local systems of production and exchange, the intensity and scale at which interests are organized and institutions formed are of a different order than at other historical moments, creating new possibilities of identification within and about Europe.

Most early anthropological studies of Europe were in villages (Blok 1974, Huseby-Darvas 1987, Pitt-Rivers 1954), or they linked the village to regional or global patterns (Cole & Wolf 1974, Freeman 1973, Schneider & Schneider 1976, Wolf 1982). To the extent that anthropologists have gone beyond the village or the region, they have tended to follow historians and study only the organization of the nation and national communities (Løfgren 1989). We cannot hope to cover most of this work, which nonetheless forms an essential research base for the study of Europeanization. Since "Europe" as an object of knowledge for research is still being constructed, we merely point to ways in which this object-in-the-making is and can be studied ethnographically.

HISTORICIZING EUROPEANIZATION

Europe as an entity is not a stable, sovereign, autonomous object but exists only in historical relations and fields of power (Foucault 1980, Geyer 1993). The relationship of the European to this entity is a form of identification that works simultaneously as a strategy of self-representation and a device of power. Such a strategy has always been as dependent on the externalization or creation of negative others as on the internal dynamics of group formation (Said 1978). It was crucial in achieving a "European self-consciousness," an understanding of the parameters of its powers through the creation of negative identities and the appropriation of difference for its own ends (Brague 1992, Fontana 1995, Herzfeld 1987). Such consciousness emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth century, in response to a "Christendom weakened by internal contradiction and pressure from without" (Hay 1957, p. 96; Bance 1992, Ra-

num 1975), long before it appeared as a strategy in Africa, Asia, or any of the other continents. European coherence has always been tied to some externality, some hypostatized other—for example, the infidel, the Orient, or the East. This coherence, however, this self-consciousness, had little effect on a sense of the political unity of Europe before the second half of the sixteenth century or on a sense of the cultural unity of Europe before the seventeenth century. The development of “Europeanism,” tied to values of progress, liberty, and freedom (versus the putative lack of those values in other continents), did not extend throughout the continent until the end of the eighteenth century when, in 1796, Edmund Burke could finally declare, “No European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe” (cited in Hay 1957, p. 123).

To create a Europe with which one could identify, where one did not feel in “complete exile” in any part, required the construction of similar institutions within which an identification *like* or *as* the Other would be possible. Such Europeans could then imagine themselves as resembling or replacing one another (Fuss 1995). In terms of political organization, this has meant the use of the nation-state model, a model that links a territorial form of political organization (states) with a particular form of peoplehood (nations) (Gellner 1983, Grillo 1980). An ethnography of a state and the principle of territorial sovereignty must necessarily focus on very different units of analysis than one of a nation.

Although peoples and religions are never discrete and bounded, the dependence of states on the principle of territorial sovereignty mandates such an assumption. States therefore have strong interests in generating, exacerbating, and institutionalizing differences with neighbors or neighboring states (Erikson 1993). Especially in the past several centuries, the identity of European states has been intricately tied to standing armies and the deployment of military machines, frequently for economic purposes (Tilly 1993). With the gradual replacement of monarchic rule by self-identified democratic polities, leaders required constant justification for the huge budget drains necessary to support standing armies. Hence they institutionalized different kinds of pretexts (e.g. national integrity and honor, national economic power, national security) for intervention or war. Territoriality, which was initially merely a top-down strategic solution to religious hatred, became a form of bottom-up self-identification and the principle of national and international order, supported by a conglomeration of interested parties (Borneman 1997).

The concept of statehood remains the central principle asserted in much international law, and it generates most of the categories used by scholars of international relations. The 1933 Montevideo Convention defined the criteria for statehood as having (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government, and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Arti-

cle 1, League of Nations Treaty Series No. 881). In practice, however, only the first two criteria have been consistently upheld by the United Nations and already existing nation-states. This concept of statehood politicizes and unifies ethnically mixed and territorially dispersed populations by conflating the two criteria in such categories as national sovereignty and national integrity, which are then appealed to in justifying war against external or internal enemies.

The nation form has another parallel but separate history (Grillo 1980, Johnson 1993, Schulze 1996). Initially taken up as a political program in the French Revolution and subsequently written into the United Nations Charter (Balibar 1991, Brubaker 1992, Hobsbawm 1990), the nation form grew out of transformed empires and tribes during European state formation (Kantorowicz 1957). This transformation of diverse peoples into unified nations was rarely accomplished without intermittent purges, cleansings, or other kinds of homogenizing processes. From the late-fifteenth to the early-seventeenth centuries, all modern Western European states have engaged in variant forms of this “generic process leading to the formation of victim groups.” Spain was the first, expelling unconverted Jews in 1492, perennially persecuting and finally expelling residents of identifiable Muslim descent in 1609, and between 1577 and 1630, expelling its Protestants, who at that time comprised 14% of the overall population. For the “purifiers,” the economic consequences of these “cleansings” were disastrous (Zolberg 1983, pp. 31–32, 35).

In the twentieth century, national consolidations and the creation of victim groups reached new heights, especially with the advent of fascist ideologies in Europe. The peace treaties concluding World War I “lumped together many peoples in single states, called some of them ‘state people’ and entrusted them with the government, silently assumed that others (such as the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, or the Croats and Slovenes in Yugoslavia) were equal partners in the government, which they of course were not, and with equal arbitrariness created out of the remnant a third group of nationalities called ‘minorities.’” The result was to make it seem to the stateless and the minorities that the treaties were “an arbitrary game which handed out rule to some and servitude to others”; the newly created states regarded the treaties “as an open breach of promise and discrimination” and subsequently ignored them. Hence the two conditions of West European nation-states—“homogeneity of population and rootedness in the soil”—were introduced into Eastern and Southern Europe (Arendt 1958, pp. 149–50).

M Rainer Lepsius (1988b, pp. 256–69) has argued that despite the wars, revolutions, and massive repressions that the nation-state has created, it has offered particular advantages to West European states, including the institutionalization of peaceful conflict-solving through the rule of law, guarantees of individual freedom, the organization of interests through parliamentary democ-

racias, and the integration of national economic development in the world economy. In each of these measures, the multiethnic, autocratic East-Central European states have been at a permanent disadvantage vis-à-vis their West European counterparts. Religious and territorial fragmentation and the inability to centralize decision-making and organize power democratically have contributed to a relative political and economic backwardness. Moreover, while a proto-nation-state model spread throughout Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Central Europe was ruled by the Hapsburg monarchy until after World War I, and Eastern Europe was liberated from Soviet domination only after 1989. Hence it should come as no surprise that most East Europeans, including peoples in the former Yugoslavia, seek to join Europe by building nation-states along what they understand as the West European model (Gal 1991, Hayden 1996).

European state building and nation formation and the development of the EU should not be elided with Europeanization, for these processes do not always work in tandem (Lepsius 1988a,b). Countries such as Norway and Poland, for example, may become more European even though they do not belong to the EU, while certain members of the EU, such as Britain, may resist Europeanization. The EU, which today is admittedly the major institutional push behind Europeanization, also deviates in essential ways from the nation-state political form. Above all, it must rely on its member states to organize its own elections and to enforce its edicts. Moreover, the EU does not have at its disposal the several centuries in which European states consolidated their nations; it must create identifications at a time when the epic form of belonging is dubious as a viable political project (MacDonald 1995). Durable versions of peoplehood may no longer be possible to organize, as they were in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century states, as though individuals were merely a function of the plot assigned to them by their national fate (Bhabha 1990). In any case, the EU has neither fate nor plot to work with. Its appeal rests firmly on individualism and freedom, values that unsettle many national plots but upon which the process of Europeanization also depends. To the extent the EU, through its central bank, takes away the monopoly on taxation and the ability to make war still enjoyed by its member states, it is just as likely that individuals will resent as they will identify with this new authority (Tilly 1990, p. 85).

Europeanization has little to which it can appeal outside of future-oriented narratives of individualism and the market. If people become Europeans, their identities no longer turn around categories of religion, folk, or national defense but around categories of exchange, difference, and value (cf Segal 1991). Unlike belonging to the nation, which has a specific cultural content, identification with Europe is an empty sign. Europe has no Spirit, in the Hegelian sense, since, unlike the nation-state, it does not live off the dead (Anderson 1983).

States conjure up ghosts who have lived and died for the nation and its territory, but within Europe there are no European graveyards, much as there is no European food or sex. Alternately, it is unlikely that Europeanization means simply the replacement of older tyrannies of self and nation by a tyranny of present markets, or of God by the Euro, as many French intellectuals fear.

In short, historicizing Europe involves tracing backward through time the two ostensibly contradictory directions in which Europe—East, West, North, South—is now pulled. For one, Western Europe is undergoing supranational, unifying processes, driven by the (Western) EU and a post-cold-war world realignment of military and economic power. These supranational processes do not replace the nation-state, which for now remains a superior form of organizing democratic participation and a territorial form of group identification. Nonetheless, they will likely force territorial states to yield some questions of sovereignty—above all, military, political, and economic—to the EU or other transnational bodies. Moreover, in this “age of information,” sovereignty frequently has no identifiable locus and therefore proves less than useful in understanding the nature of power and process (Appadurai 1991, King 1991). The other direction is the reaffirmation of nation-state sovereignty and national group differences among EU members. Along both directions, East-Central Europe is engaged in a multitrajectory process to catch up to the West, creating relatively homogeneous nation-states as a precondition for entrance into the EU and submitting to supranational economic and political regimes that restrict the sovereignty of the new national states.

ETHNOLOGIZING EUROPEANIZATION

Peoples, Cultures, National Stereotypes

Tensions in the push and pull on Europe as an object of knowledge, a strategy of self-representation, and a form of identification are frequently avoided in descriptions by people—academics, intellectuals, national or cultural spokespersons—both on and outside the continent, who instead focus on the production of national and cultural stereotypes (Kaschuba 1994). We organize the following discussion around these tensions. While all identifications have to confront the power of stereotypes and caricatures, and frequently succumb to them, they are nonetheless fundamentally ambivalent. Identifications are always marked by a fascination with the possibility of resembling or, in the extreme, replacing the Other and alternately by a fear of one’s need for this Other and of what is at stake in acknowledging resemblance or replacement.

In managing such tense ambivalences, both analysts of Europe and the peoples of Europe they study have relied on metaphors. The descriptive promi-

nence of a particular metaphorical domain varies historically and by place, and identificatory metaphors tend to deteriorate into stereotyping and caricature. Stereotyping may be the most powerful tool used to manage identificatory ambivalences and to maintain a particular domain of metaphors (Fernandez 1986, Herzfeld 1997, MacDonald 1993). As European powers interact, two other metaphors have become particularly prominent: markets, projecting exchangeability and the freedom of choice on which consumer identities depend (Bergelman & Pauwels 1992, Chapman 1995), and marriage, projecting domestic stabilization and encompassment into a harmonious whole, the model around which affective life and security are organized. The micropractices involved in the “regulation of life” (Foucault 1980) rely on the disciplinary techniques of the market and marriage. But these metaphors work in two opposite directions, the former to globalize, the latter to localize. This metaphorical prominence is attributable, on the one hand, to a new obscurity about the site of political agency, sovereignty, and accountability (Habermas 1987); to the increased global penetration of bounded social units; and to the dissolution of the ability to make clear distinctions between friend and foe (obviating the utility of national militaries). On the other hand, it is due to the bourgeoisification of European everyday life, which extends far beyond those who consider themselves bourgeois (Løfgren 1989, Maier 1975).

As states increasingly yield control of their own financial markets to supranational institutions, like the EU, market metaphors become globally rather than nationally inflected identifications. Alternately, marriage—the uniting of a man and a woman into a privileged whole—remains the state’s major legal instrument and nexus for regulating kinship and analogizing socially sanctioned relations between self and other (Goody 1973, 1983, 1990; Hajnal 1965; Pina-Cabral 1992; Segalen 1986; Segalen & Gullestad 1995). States resist yielding control of marriage to other political units. In the past ten years, European states have, however, extended the marital analogy—along with its legal protections, privileges, and social controls—far beyond its reproductive and property base. Especially legal experts have used kinship categories—adoption, descent, consanguinity, marriage—to regulate the growing number of cross-sex relationships that merely resemble marriages, extending the metaphor, most controversially, to same-sex relationships. The EU and its highest court have also stepped into this domain, frequently from a “human rights” perspective, to forbid certain forms of discrimination against nonmarried peoples. The struggle for control of kinship—residence, marriage, childcare, sex, intimacy, inheritance, generational obligations—in its most encompassing anthropological sense, also involves redefining social reproduction (Strathern 1992). The penetration of the market and the EU into marriage and kinship is redefining national life courses and creating the possibility for European ones.

Since the sixteenth century, the “peoples and cultures” of Europe have objectified themselves and others through a set of systematized national stereotypes, with which everyone is familiar though certainly not in agreement (Chock 1987). Initially these ideal types were drawn from classical arguments about essential categories of age, sex, and temperament (Castiglione 1976) and written to use as compliments for the reception of ambassadors at foreign courts. Soon they were based on observations and turned into epic-like “national characteristics” inferred from climate, soil, and temperament (Huarte 1976), or “habits,” “style of mind,” and “manners of living” which depended on place, political regime, and period (Barclay 1612). In sum, national characteristics originated with and among royalty, spread to the bourgeoisie, and only later entered folklore and everyday life, where they have taken on an independent existence and remain an essential source for nationalism (Elias 1978).

These stereotypes are now systematized in the saccharin concept of “unity in diversity,” the idea of a European continent whose major characteristic is its diverse “family of nations.” To the extent the nations of Europe are seen as cultural gestalts that in turn act out familial pathologies, they represent a mytho-historical model for anthropomorphic caricature, useful to essentialize and to eliminate ambiguities for both self-understanding and othering. Their further use and study will likely strengthen identification with an epic national character at the expense of more partial, heterogeneous, and ambivalent European identifications.

At another level, however, “epic” stereotypes are undergoing a novelization (Bakhtin 1981) tied more to a heterogeneous future than to a single past, as they contribute to an image of a paternalistic European family of nations (MacDonald 1996). Driven by the increasing size and power of the EU, a new and less stable hierarchy of European identifications is emerging. Nations are being brought into new relations with each other, creating new alliances and enmities, and even recreating themselves under the changing conditions of membership and action. General North/South and East/West cleavages are still used to characterize Europe, with the North considered orderly, productive, and largely Protestant; the South spontaneous, fun-loving, and largely Catholic; the East poor and underdeveloped both politically and economically; and the West rich and developed.

Europe’s two most powerful nations—France and Germany—are viewed and view themselves as parents, along with a powerful third and ambiguous relative, Britain, unsettling and resettling the Franco-German alliance. As a British intellectual put it: “In the politics of Europe, monogamy is a sin and polygamy a virtue. France and Germany are joined in holy wedlock. Although they are unfaithful to each other from time to time (generally the secret assign-

nation is with Britain), by and large it is, if not a love match, then a marriage of convenience. By comparison, Britain is a wanton woman taking her pleasure in a suite at the Savoy or in an alleyway behind Shepherd Market” (Garel-Jones 1996, p. 20). If Britain is a wanton woman, it is because she has never been able to recover from the loss of her empire and the hollow victories in the two world wars. Germany, which dominates the purse through its central bank and strong currency, is always gendered as the patriarch. Given its criminal history in this century, however, Germany would rather dissolve itself into Europe, though it has retained its faith in the Herderian project of each part contributing its own bit to history. France, like Britain, is haunted by its colonial ties but still desires to lead the Europeanization process.

Europe’s peripheral nations test the ability to integrate marginal peoples into the EU. This integration process displays not only the limitations on the resolve to unify Europe but also the willingness of nations to Europeanize. For now, Greece, for example, is serving as the bad child, ignoring pan-European concerns in the Balkans; acting egotistically; and resisting major economic structural reforms with its huge public debt, high inflation, and use of EU subsidies to prop up public consumption and income redistribution. Portugal, conversely, might be called a good child, obedient to EU norms, acknowledging its dependence within the union. Since joining the EU, Portugal has followed the tough IMF monetary restructuring and stabilization plan, invested its EU subsidies into infrastructure such as freeway development—and become economically weaker, losing quality jobs and increasing its food imports.

Finally, there are distant cousins, the new wealthy nations just brought in: Sweden, Austria, and Finland. Switzerland and Norway do not appear to want to enter soon. They may be black sheep within the EU, though nonentrance may paradoxically make them more European. All the East-Central Europeans are in the difficult position of second cousins with lesser rights. The “in-transition” countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are the closest to entry. Other cousins, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Serbia, are unwelcome bastards and considered unlikely candidates. All prospective members are considered juvenile if not actively infantilized by their Western relatives and must undergo a probationary period of Europeanization before being ostensibly adopted by the family.

Perspectives on the European Union

The EU is not the only factor, nor is it always the most significant, when it is compared with other transnational regimes that affect the making of Europe, such as the Helsinki Accords on Human Rights, the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, multinational technology projects such as Ariane,

Organization of Economic Cooperation and Security, the World Bank, or the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Although macrolevel descriptions or speculative analyses alone might confirm the widespread suspicion that the “‘European’ edifice...remains fundamentally hollow, selfishly obsessed with fiscal rectitude and commercial advantage?” (Judt 1996, p. 9), research to date paints a more complex picture.

Historians have traditionally defined the terms for talking about the “making of Europe,” meaning the construction of national histories or the tracing of objects through time. An excellent general series with this title, edited by Jacques LeGoff, is being published simultaneously in four languages, covering such topics as the sea (Mollat du Jourdin 1993), the Enlightenment (Im Hof 1994), states, nations and nationalism (Schulze 1996), Western Christendom (Brown 1996), cities (Benevelo 1995), language (Eco 1995), revolutions (Tilly 1993), and Europe and its other (Fontana 1995).

Political scientists control most research on the EU, understandably because they specialize in the analysis of governments. Yet their focus on the EU as a supragovernment among other levels of government elides two interesting anthropological questions. First, is the EU comparable to the world’s recorded repertoire of past governments, or is it a distinctly new kind of political unit in human history? Second, does the expansion of the EU substantively change the nature of Europeanization? Professional anthropologists, to the extent that they do not restrict study to national stereotypes and their legacies, are situated between historians and political scientists, concerned with the making of Europe in interaction with the EU. How this location might bear on researching Europeanization is worth exploring.

Three major foci characterize the current anthropological study of the EU and Europe. The first approach is to study the EU at its centers, to examine “Eurocrats” and the administrative and political cultures of European institutions. The second is a bottom-up approach, to examine national symbols and everyday experiences in interaction with the EU. The third is a focus on spheres of interaction where peoples of Europe engage in face-to-face encounters with each other.

EU power is centered in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg, where the EU is present as a parliament, court, and executive council. These centers are the source and symbolic center of the EU, but they are also forming a culture of their own, distinct from the national cultures they are to represent (Abélès & Bellier 1996). Some people have become identified as “Eurocrats” who speak their own mix of languages. The European Commission and other Eurobodies might be analyzed as “melting pots,” with their own formal and informal politics, their own everyday work rhythms and social schedules (Abélès 1992, 1993, 1995; Abélès & Bellier 1996). Anthropologists have also taken up the

EU as a bureaucracy (Herzfeld 1992, Wright 1994), EU bureaucrats (Shore 1995), EU cultural policies (Shore 1993), the view of Europe from Brussels (Shore & Black 1992), and the EU space agency (Zabusky 1995).

A second approach is to study not the elites who make EU policies and sit in its centers but EU interactions with local communities (Boissevain 1975, Wilson & Smith 1993). Perhaps the domain where this approach has most frequently been employed is with regard to EU agricultural policy and food [e.g. Italian and French wine growers and the EU (Giordano 1987), Iberian fisherman and EU policy (LiPuma & Meltzoff 1989), Irish farmers (Shutes 1991, 1993; Wilson 1989), and Dutch and Spanish farmers (Jurjus 1993)]. There is also a growing field of studies of the ways in which the EU is appropriated in local contexts [Corsican symbolization of land as region and nation (Jaffe 1993), EU policy influence on self-image and possessions in Greece (Costa 1993), issues of EU bureaucracy and accountability in Greece (Herzfeld 1992), immigrants and transnational phenomenon (Gullick 1993, McDonough 1993), and appropriation of European symbolism in Hungary (Hofer 1994)].

Perhaps the processes of nationalism and transnationalism have been most interestingly studied at international borders (Donnan & Wilson 1994, O'Dowd & Wilson 1996, Wilson 1993b), where there are constant changes in the content of "nationalist symbols involving flags, colors, road signs, graffiti, and parades" (Wilson 1996, pp. 210–15). Contra Judt (1996), Wilson (1995, p. 14) resists identifying the EU "as principally an organization of economic integration" but instead views it as "moving between locality, region, state, and supranation." Nonetheless, he speculates that the EU is developing into a "new type of sociopolitical configuration" where "national elites and state governments and bureaucracies are losing power." In fact, "EU-building is splintering the identification of the citizen with the state" (Wilson 1993a; 1996, p. 211).

A third approach, suggested by MacDonald (1995, pp. 7, 12, 15), entails the study of "everyday encounters" and face-to-face interactions where people work with stereotypes and construct commonalities and differences. The EU, she writes, "is not inherently composed...of any mosaic or patchwork of national cultures.... It is composed of people who mutually construct their sense and boundaries of self through relations with others." Therefore we should pay more attention to "people's own perceptions of the world...if we want to understand why people behave as they do, including why they might appear to resent or resist some policies perceived to come from Brussels."

Following upon these pioneer studies, we suggest five relatively unexplored domains of practice where the process of Europeanization might be fruitfully studied: languages, money, tourism, sex, and sport. Our choice of domains is not meant to be exhaustive.

PRACTICES OF EUROPEANIZATION

Languages

The dream of an elixir that could solve the problems of European polyglottism by establishing a language of exact equivalence between words and things seems to have been exhausted. The sixteenth-century attempt to recover the language used by Adam and his descendants before the catastrophe of Babel (the contenders being Hebrew, Egyptian, Irish, and Chinese) and the twentieth-century creation of artificial languages such as Esperanto, Beginner's All-Purpose Symbolic Instruction Code (BASIC), or Pascal appear to most of us today as futile and foolish (Eco 1995). Diverse languages are now assumed, seen more as necessary reflections of different worlds than as barriers to communication.

In Europe, language unification was accomplished through public education as part of projects of national unification. Subsequently, states have become the protectors of separate national languages, with intrinsic interests in emphasizing differences between the adjacent languages of other countries and in creating the language as a symbol of national belonging and historical treasure, establishing it as a common denominator of its citizenry. Since their legitimacy was and remains tied to the "robustness" of their languages, European states are also engaged in a permanent competition for linguistic dominance within the continent and in global arenas. Nonetheless, the nature of global exchange increasingly requires people who can speak other languages. A state that does not encourage its citizenry to learn additional foreign languages will create for itself a legitimation deficit, for it will be greatly disadvantaged in economic, political, and cultural exchanges. Given this context, de Swaan (1995, p. 10) concludes that "amalgamation among European languages is unlikely, and national languages will retain almost all of their functions in their domestic context." Diglossia will prevail, with at least one foreign language added to the mother tongue. This diglossia will likely become indexical with a cosmopolitan form of Europeanization, with the identifications of monolinguals driven more by loyalties to national and provincial cultures.

In the past couple decades, there has developed a kind of stampede toward English (de Swaan 1995, p. 3) as a second language on a European and even global scale. Among Western Europeans, the "repertoire of more than three out of four multilingual speakers contains English" and, in de Swaan's (p. 9) vivid description, English is the "sun for the national planets" that circle around it, the center of the linguistic galaxy. Much as Russian enables continued communication between members of the Soviet Union's successor states and Arabic links together the North African and Middle Eastern peoples who worship Islam, English holds the EU together and is quickly becoming the

connective to East-Central Europe. This situation is historically novel, quite different than European antiquity, for example, when Latin was the central language within Europe. Latin was shared only among the elites, whose monopoly on literacy prevented widespread access to sacred texts and to the discourses of power. The dynamics in the contemporary democratic political units of Europe are such that elites and masses partake in more egalitarian relationships, frequently going to the same schools and developing similar skills. This certainly does not preclude the development of hierarchies of competency and status (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, Willis 1977), but today, access to language training, education, and information is difficult to foreclose and fix. With the growth of visual fields of “entertainment” and mass electronic communication, other kinds of symbolic capital and hierarchies are being created that evade the stratifications that run along national linguistic axes.

Because the dominance of English within Europe is so recent (Zabusky 1995), the modes by which it establishes its dominance in everyday life and ritual occasions deserve much more attention (Ammon et al 1987–1988). The lucrative global markets in music, film, and fashion immediately come to mind as modes in which English hegemony reign. In addition, the situations in which multilinguistic competence (not always involving English) is demanded or performed, particularly among tourists, participants in international political forums, and in commercial situations, are particularly revealing moments in which cosmopolitan and provincial identifications are at stake, being discarded, chosen, or shared. During the cold war, Eastern European states adopted an official policy of learning Russian as a second language, but people widely resisted this policy. It not only resulted in resistance to Russian but also prevented East-Central Europeans from learning the languages necessary for direct access to international science, technology, and entertainment. All of the states of Central Europe abandoned the Russian language policy after 1989 and abruptly switched to teaching English and German, which are now in a new competition for dominance as the second language.

Money

Much as national languages have become symbols of diverse European identities, so have national currencies served as personal identifiers and as the essential instrument of a state’s monetary policies. Paralleling the search for a medium enabling universal translatability of languages, European policymakers have sought to make their national currencies convertible and exchangeable. Following the cold war, such convertibility has been more or less achieved for all European states. The proposal to introduce in the year 2002 the Euro, an EU common currency, now promises to replace the competition and adjustment between national currencies with a system of central control and regulation.

Proponents and “Euroskeptics” agree that what is at stake is sovereignty: the ability to control the relationship between politics and identifications at the national, European, or global levels. Money poses not only the central questions concerning exchange, difference, and control over value, it also postures as a transcendent, phallic authority: the measure of all value but that which itself has no measure or value (Goux 1990).

The mystical transformative power that a European currency is believed to have is reflected in the equally mystical terms used to describe it. The currency was first named the “ecu,” a simple acronym for European Currency Unit, but was changed to the Euro, making it the phonetic and lexical equivalent of the prefix used to Europeanize objects, such as EuroDisney and Erotica. Europeanization pretends to be neutral and empty of content, preserving what is best of tradition while promoting modernization and global competitiveness. Hence the Euro was initially described as a “basket currency” that would contain other currencies like Confetti Lira, the Beautiful Mark, the soft Belgian franc, or the hard Dutch guilder. In December 1996, the EU commission responsible for design of the Euro reached a decision about which icons would be represented on the paper bills. The national patrimonies appearing on national currencies, frequently in the form of heroes from foundational periods, were too contentious. Instead, the Euro will have faces of famous architectural monuments, which tend to be more continentally than nationally defined. Certainly these icons will change as the face of Europe itself changes.

Proponents of a single currency argue that it is the *sine qua non* of a single European market that, they believe, cannot exist with the risk of instability, competitive devaluations, inflation, and exchange rate uncertainty. Once consolidated as a market, it is believed that western Europe will be able to compete with economies as large as those of North America and Asia. Some also argue that monetary union can take place quite independently, or even without, political union. The Austrian schilling has been fixed against the deutsche mark for 13 years, and Dutch short-term interest rates have not diverged from German rates by more than 0.8% in 8 years. Yet nobody would deny that Austria and the Netherlands are sovereign states. The most vigorous proponents of the Euro, which include bankers, large companies, and many politicians, argue that its introduction will be a major political act that, while preserving national identities, will allow a genuine rebirth of Europe.

Others view plans for a single currency less optimistically. Initially coming from the political right, particularly in Great Britain, these critics see the convergence criteria laid out by the Maastricht summit as too severe, unrealistic, and threatening to national sovereignty. Still others fear that strong currencies like the deutsche mark will be replaced by a weakened, inflation-prone Euro. More recently, opposition has come from the left, most forcefully articulated by

Pierre Bourdieu and other French intellectuals. Although this criticism also focuses centrally around the issue of sovereignty, it defines sovereignty not in terms of a traditional national defense but as the protection of diverse European "civilizational" legacies: trade unions and labor rights, general unemployment benefits, and free and universal access to humanistic education. Introduction of the Euro threatens to situate all political decisions in economic and Social Darwinistic frameworks, removing the ability of local national governments to make policy for the common good. Rational political decisions, such as for universal health care and education, are often not rational economically.

All states, including those that do not adopt the Euro, will be affected by its usage. Hence money has received much attention in the press and in parliaments throughout the continent. Varenne (1993, p. 232) has argued that "[t]he kind of existence that it [Europe] does appear to have is that of a common 'market,' a soul-less place where merchants exploit their customers.... 'Europe' reduced to a market is indeed, nothing." This insistence on "nothingness" fails to recognize that the market itself can function as cultural content to replace the interaction of national culture and politics with a different logic. If the Euro does symbolize the nothingness that is Europe, then it is a symbol of the values of exchangeability and substitutability, thereby representing cosmopolitanism as transcendence itself. A promising area for future research in both East and West Europe would be the ongoing resymbolization of money in everyday life and the ways in which regimes of credit are changing the nature and locus of sovereignty (Verdery 1996). Another line of inquiry would be into the new monetary Euro-language: how institutions and individuals translate their national currencies, together with their associated symbolisms, through the medium of what the Bavarian Minister of Environment Peter Gauweiler has coined the new "Esperanto money."

Tourism

Tourism is a privileged domain in which European identifications are created, for it is abroad that nationals find opportunities to vacation with other nationals and where they are identified by others as either nationals or Europeans. The paradigmatic approach to this topic, criticized by Crick (1989), regards indigenous societies as unwilling "hosts" and international tourists as unwelcome "guests" who destroy cultural difference (Boissevain 1996, Smith 1989). Tourism in this framework is a destroyer of culture rather than a set of complex cultural practices in itself.

In contrast to anthropology's general disdain for tourism, the European Commission has recently shown a strong interest in what it has come to define as cultural tourism in Europe (Richards 1996): "According to the European Union, 'tourism, and especially cultural tourism in a broader sense...deserve

priority attention' as policy areas... (Bernadini 1992). Cultural tourism has become recognized as an important agent of economic and social change in Europe. Politicians now refer to cultural heritage as 'Italy's General Motors'... (Fanelli 1993) or as 'the oil industry of France'... (Mosser 1994)."

Having made the claim that cultural tourism deserves "policy attention," in 1991, the EU set up the European Association for Tourism and Leisure Education (ATLAS) committee to conduct a transnational study of European cultural tourism. Their first major problem was to define in any meaningful sense cultural tourism. Because of their policy orientation, there was felt to be a need to quantify the phenomenon of cultural tourism so that its economic impact, as well as its future economic potential, could be assessed. It was also recognized, however, that a quantitatively oriented definition did not sufficiently account for the many practices that could fall under the definition of cultural tourism. The definitions that ATLAS came up with were as follows (Richards 1996, p. 24):

Conceptual definition: "The movement of persons to cultural attractions away from their normal place of residence, with the intention to gather new information and experiences to satisfy their cultural needs."

Technical definition: "All movements of persons to specific cultural attractions, such as heritage sites, artistic and cultural manifestations, arts and drama outside their normal place of residence."

By drawing attention to the importance of tourism as a way of learning about the world and of satisfying "cultural needs," the definitions take tourism seriously and also implicitly acknowledge that tourists themselves take what they do seriously. The very breadth of definitions, however, limits their utility. Most limiting is the acceptance of a reified and anachronistic version of that which constitutes the object of touristic interest: culture. The technical definition equates culture with "heritage sites, artistic and cultural manifestations, arts and drama." This does not allow that cultural practices, rather than material culture artifacts or elite institutions (museums, art galleries, historical sites), are just as likely to be the object of touristic interest.

Within Europe, there is now a market-driven element in sharing experiences abroad, in losing or at least sensing the loss of national significations, which has led to the extension of the word tourism to activities outside the semantic scope of vacations. New activities abound, such as medical tourism (in pursuit of organ transplants, operations, and treatments), drug tourism (with Amsterdam the favorite site), and sex tourism. This kind of tourism generates official anxieties by creating the potential for nonnational identifications. In France, *narcotourisme* usually refers to the organized visits of elderly ladies to Dutch "coffee shops" (the English word is used in the Netherlands) to smoke

pot. Tourism also extends to French youth who travel to shoot up heroin. The drug policies of the Netherlands are a total irritant to their neighbors, for though Dutch authorities seized some 246.9 tons of illegal narcotics in 1993 (compared with 63.5 tons in France, 60.5 in Belgium, and 282.2 in Germany), the Netherlands has only 1.6 drug addicts per 1000 inhabitants (compared with 1.5 in Germany, 1.7 in Belgium, and 2.6 in France) (Demetz 1996, pp. 82–84). Such examples indicate that nonnational attractions are just as likely, if not more likely, to motivate touristic interest as Renaissance paintings and Roman ruins.

Essentializing the objects of tourist interest, as the ATLAS definition does, denies their historicity and hence suspends time (Barthes 1972, p. 76). Tourists, however, perpetually play with the limitations of time as well as space, often manipulating the boundaries of one to explore the boundaries of the other, thereby bringing in to play the notion that Bakhtin (1981) has called the “chronotope.” Spaces are set aside to “recreate” the past in burgeoning heritage industries, which are then set up as ways to relive this past in the present (Badone 1991, pp. 518–45). In the late 1980s, for example, the economically depressed city of Liverpool was able to reinvent itself as a tourist attraction by drawing attention to its status as the birthplace of the Beatles. Visitors to the once-derelict Albert Dock are now invited to relive the swinging 1960s in the Beatles museum housed in a former warehouse, after which they can take “ticket-to-ride tours” around the city to look at the houses in which John, Paul, George, and Ringo grew up. Tourists are not simply invited to reinvent a nostalgic version of Liverpool’s past, they are invited to relive the pasts of other people. The increasing use of simulation in the tourist industry suggests the extent to which tourism is about visiting not only other places but also other times. Tourists attempt not only to see but also to visit the past, as in the case of York’s Viking museum, which simulates even the smells of a village in the Middle Ages. They also attempt to visit the future, as can be illustrated by Disneyland Paris’s Tomorrowland.

Since the beginning of modern tourism in the seventeenth century, travelers have been primary promulgators of cultural stereotypes, as both observers and observed. Notions of difference among European cultures are constructed and confirmed through such face-to-face contact (MacDonald 1995). Tourism might frequently be less about the construction of stereotypes than the dismantling of them, as anyone who has been to Sweden in search of a promiscuous sexual partner could testify. Future work might fruitfully address how “cultural knowledge” is itself conceptualized and generated by tourists, the ways in which tourist practices constitute attempts to gain cultural knowledge, and finally the limitations and opportunities that various tourist practices offer in this capacity.

The strong links between tourism and anthropology lead some, such as McCannell (1976), to argue that tourism is effectively an amateur version of anthropology. If this is the case, it remains to be seen whether tourism will undergo the same kind of changes that anthropology has in the twentieth century. Stereotypes of the Other produced in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century anthropology have certainly been taken up as the object of interest by tourists in search of the Real. As anthropology has become more reflexive and interactive, there has also been evidence that tourism is seeking to do the same, hence the popularity of the idea of having an “experience” while abroad. In *gîte* vacations in rural France and Italy, the goal is to live like a local rather than as a colonial expatriate in the nearest Sheraton. It is no longer satisfactory simply to observe the Other; tourists now expect to interact with and even become—if only temporarily—the Other.

Sex

In the media-hyped, truthless late twentieth century, adolescence is easy for no one, not even for Europe. The peoples of Europe are now undergoing an analogous period of self-discovery, coming to terms with the maturing body of Europe, with its desires, its orifices and closures, and its sexual identifications. Increased interactions between nationals across class and status groups within and outside Europe are radically altering practices of sex. In the eyes of North Americans, Europe’s sexual identity has always been, while assuredly heterosexual, uniformly and confidently permissive and pleasure driven.

For the peoples of Europe, however, these identifications are wishful projections. Europe has no single sexuality, and to the extent that sex is patterned, people in Europe do not see themselves as particularly permissive. Sexual practices are nationally defined, regulated, and policed, but they now travel with increasing speed and frequency. The opening of borders within the EU and between East and West Europe along with wide electronic and print media access to proliferating erotic images is facilitating not only political and economic integration but a Europeanization of desires and practices (cf Ariès & Béjin 1985, Bechdolf et al 1993). Today, one can enjoy a French kiss in England or “go Greek” in Sweden. Nowhere, however, can one have European sex, at least not in Europe.

The complex sexual geography of Europe is not revealed in its conservative and liberal ideologies or in its governmental prohibitions, societal repressions, and individual responses—as Foucault (1980) long ago pointed out—but in its spatial diffusion and regulation of bodily practices (Mosse 1985). Current regulatory systems, including legal regimes, that qualify and clarify which sexual practices will be permitted and encouraged and which will be restricted

and forbidden are increasingly ineffective with respect to their stated goals. In terms of providing direction for research, they function at best in an ad hoc manner to index domains of conflict. In some cases, the conflict is between national legal values and EU norms, with the interactions in the “free market” generating practices that bypass or intersect in novel ways with both forms of *reglementation*. National parliamentarians frequently claim that the EU is dictating what its sexual practices should be. Such whining by national political figures usually indicates that the EU supports the position of one of their opponents. These EU dictates are regarded sometimes as too liberal (as in the case of Britain with regard to sex), sometimes as too stringent (as in the case of the Netherlands with regard to sex). In other cases, such as the use of the pill or abortion or the regulation of pornography, conflict is not between national and supranational norms but between religious and secular authorities. In all cases, sex is a central domain for negotiating and reconfiguring popular and political authority in the context of Europeanization and globalization.

The redefinition of Europe’s sexual identities has involved the isolation of locations where certain kinds of sexual practices are actually legal and constitute an essential economic industry. We call these places “Eurogenous zones.” They are marked by functional specialization, with cities such as Hamburg (kinky hetero sex) and Amsterdam (safer, regulated hetero sex and a large homosexual culture) within northwestern Europe, Cracow in eastern Europe (which features Europe’s only lesbian sauna), and Seyches and Mykonos in southern Europe (large gay male resorts). Moreover, the zones are all well-known tourist sites, with both customers and “suppliers” often coming from elsewhere to be someone else. Since 1989, there has been a huge recruitment of women from Eastern Europe, especially Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, to service West Europe’s heterosexual male desires. The effects of this movement and these experiences on practices of kinship and intimacy have yet to be researched.

Reproductive heterosexuality within marriage remains the social and legal “regulative ideal” within all of Europe, and states offer a plethora of well-known incentives such as tax breaks and pronatal policies to encourage its practice. As with all ideals, however, not only are they difficult to enforce, the set of prohibitions on which their authority rests also tends to produce alternatives and oppositions. These oppositions are then reincorporated into the regulative mechanisms, changing in turn the initial regulative ideal. In Amsterdam, for example, the established red light districts are centered around the official licensing of heterosexual brothels. Brothel owners are now held responsible for the health of the prostitutes who work there in order to prevent the spread of AIDS and the prostitution of children.

The national regulation of social heterodoxies—often perceived as potential social problems—has therefore been achieved through an essentially geographic policy that limits certain sexual practices to clearly defined locations where they may be more effectively—even if more permissively—monitored. In turn, however, these new Eurogenous zones are available for exploration by others located elsewhere in the body of Europe. Whereas some states have called for the EU to take measures to stamp out “sex tourism,” as it is called, in its “Philoxenia Programme” of European tourism promotion, Dutch ministers recently resisted legislative proposals designed to curb many of these activities. They insisted that their liberal traditions barred them from accepting, an initiative undertaken after Belgium’s “paedophile murders” of 1995, a proposed agreement to ensure punishment of people who possessed, for their own use, videos and other material featuring children in sexual acts.

Examples where European legislation is seen to be too inhibiting or too permissive in relation to national sentiments might serve as “diagnostic events” (Moore 1987) for ethnographic research on processes of Europeanization. One such event happened in fall 1996 when Britain’s National Heritage Secretary, Virginia Bottomly, outlawed the French hard-core pornographic television channel “Rendez-Vous,” which could be received by British viewers owning “smart cards” capable of decoding the scrambled signal broadcast from Paris. Because the European Court of Justice had previously ruled that such channels could not be prevented from being beamed into Britain, however, Bottomly was forced to ban sales of the smart cards used to decode the scrambled signal. The national restriction of access to a resource already made readily available from Europe is an example of the continuing struggle between individual rights, national regulation of pleasures in the home, and how contemporary technology can affect the geographical diffusion of sexual codes. With the right technology, every home in Europe with a satellite television and a smart card is poised to become a Eurogenous zone.

Negotiations over the proliferation of new sexual practices within Europe are not, however, limited to national versus EU notions of acceptability. For example, the scathing attack on the EU made by the Pontifical Council for the Family, an advisory body under Pope John Paul II, illustrates the continuing potency of religious forces. It drew attention to Europe’s “Demographic Winter”—the phenomenon of falling birth rates and declining populations—which it blamed on women’s activities outside the home, the devaluation of the notion of motherhood, and the introduction of spurious rights pertaining to reproductive health, homosexuality, and abortion. Given widespread chronic unemployment throughout Europe, the Pope’s alarming message of a demographic winter and a shrinking labor force has had little effect on policy.

Finally, sex is not only a device of control and power over the marginalized or the middle class but is also deployed to challenge the powerful, as can be seen by the constant interest in sexual scandals, ranging from British politicians to Princess Stephanie of Monaco. Contemporary Europe is fertile ground for engaging in the kind of analysis, called for by Foucault (1980, p. 11), of the way in which the practices of sex are “put into discourse.”

Sport

Like tourism, sport promotes the physical movement of Europeans—both players and supporters—throughout Europe. Both activities result occasionally in violent interaction. Like sex, drugs, and food, sport reveals conflicts between various interest groups seeking to control its regulation and has been subject to similar conflicts between the explicit goals of the EU vis-à-vis national and local powers. Money is also central as sport becomes commoditized and various financial interests compete for control over the relationship between players, clubs, and spectators viewing games either in person or via their television sets. No other sport illustrates these developments more clearly than soccer, because no other sport has been developed to a comparable degree at the European level. For that reason, we limit our discussion to this sport. Like the EU itself, soccer is an institutionalized system of aggressive yet cooperative competition among global, national, and local entities. As such, it is the quintessential European pursuit and is fast becoming an archetypal example of Europeanization.

European soccer is a matter of everyday discussion in every European country. It has moved far from its origins as a stage for class struggle between British upper-class “public school” amateurs and industrial working-class professionals (Curtis 1993). The remarkable popularity of soccer has depended largely on the medium of television, which now expands the notion of audience, participation, and spectatorship beyond just stadium support, which also continues to be massive. As with televised pornography, European soccer is available to every European who has the technology to receive the now nightly broadcast tournament matches. Consequently, technological rather than spatial mobility is the key factor determining the extent to which Europeans can partake in this particular form of Europeanization. In some cases, the growing popularity of televised sport is leading to cultural changes in the ways in which people spend their leisure time. The lucrative benefits that television coverage offers local soccer clubs (estimated to be \$2 billion until the year 2003 alone) have implications that will affect the quality of the game, as soccer games now run six nights a week. They are also having significant effects on how the game is organized as players and clubs, both local and national, compete for resources.

At the heart of this process is the Union of European Football Association, the European body that organizes and regulates competitions at the European level. UEFA, much like other administrative bodies representing noncommercial interests, is now affected by dictates of the EU originally intended to apply to the private sector. Particularly significant was the European Court of Justice's so-called Bosman decision of December 1995. UEFA argued that 6 of the 11 players on a team should have lived for a number of years in the team's country. The court ruled that Article 48 of the EU treaty guaranteed the free movement of workers between member states, and therefore removed restrictions on the nationality of players comprising a given team.

The outcome, called free agency in North America, is a genuine Europeanizing of local teams as nationals from one country play in teams of another. European Cup teams, though still representing themselves as localities by usually taking their names from the cities in which the clubs were founded, are now, at least in theory, able to build teams in which no player originates from the club's city—or even country—of origin. Soccer is thus a concrete example of how Europeanization involves identification and subsequent replacement by other nationals. For example, Manchester United's celebrated "English king of soccer," Eric Cantona, is French. The European organization of soccer is therefore undermining the locality-based rationale for identification between fans and the clubs they support: To support Manchester United is not necessarily to support a team comprised of players from Manchester or even from Britain.

Identification with the local teams is further complicated in that there is no longer a cultural or racial resemblance between the players and their primarily working- and middle-class male followers—and this at a time when the media and fans celebrate players as national heroes. The hooliganism and violence associated with many soccer fans is most frequently rationalized as solidarity with the team and defense of the home territory. With neither territorial unit nor local "people" to defend, it remains to be seen against whom the violence will be directed and how it will be rationalized in the future.

As with the the Europeanization of national currency, the Europeanization of soccer is also part of a strategy that will enable it to compete successfully in a global context. The process of identification with and replacement by the Other does not stop with Europeans within Europe, for soccer teams are increasingly drawing from the labor resources of nations lying far beyond European horizons of the present, especially from its colonial past. To name but three examples, Tijani Babangida, a member of Nigeria's gold medal-winning Olympic team, now plays for Ajax Amsterdam; the Australian Ned Zelic now plays for Auxerre; Fenerbahçe's coach Sebastio Lazaroni is Brazilian.

The Bosman decision also declared that clubs can no longer collect transfer fees from players bought by other teams once the players' contracts have expired. Players can no longer be regarded as valuable assets to be sold once they have been acquired but are effectively rented rather than owned by the clubs. This adversely affects small clubs which were previously able to raise substantial revenues by selling their star players at the end of their contracts. The Scottish club Celtic, for example, was unable to collect a \$3 million transfer fee when John Collins, its star player, was sold to Monaco. Celtic argued that Monaco is not part of the EU and that the Bosman ruling was therefore inapplicable. The European Court upheld its decision, however, on the basis that Monaco plays in UEFA competitions. By imposing its larger commercial goals in the realm of sport, the European Court has effectively rendered soccer players as spatially and temporally deregulated commodities to be bought and sold—or who can buy and sell themselves—like any other means of production.

Soccer's massive popularity in Europe makes it a medium for the direct experience of Europeanization. Anthropologists will find that, as with tourism, money, language, and sex, the realm of sport is one in which previously unchallenged and secure identifications are being significantly reshaped. National soccer fans have, in the past, committed violent, xenophobic, and sometimes fatal acts in their frenzied and self-styled warrior-like support of local and national teams. The ways in which individuals respond to the reorganization of their cherished national sport, given the challenges to the traditional relations of player to clubs and spectators, will tell us very little about the "illusion of Europe," but it will reveal how Europe is becoming more European.

CONCLUSION

Most American observers are ambivalent about the EU and are unaware of Europeanization, whereas our European colleagues are divided on both the institution and the process. Locked in an almost manic-depressive cycle of Europhoria and Europessimism, we might do better to drop the search for a totalizing metaphor and the analogies with a European superstate or a United States of Europe. Instead, we suggest dealing with the EU as a continental political unit of a novel order, and with Europeanization pragmatically as a spirit, a vision, and a process.

Visit the *Annual Reviews* home page at
<http://www.AnnualReviews.org>.

Literature Cited

- Abélès M. 1992. *La Vie Quotidienne au Parlement Européen*. Paris: Hachette
- Abélès M. 1993. Political anthropology of a transnational institution: the European parliament. *Fr. Polit. Soc.* 11(1):1-19
- Abélès M. 1995. Pour une anthropologie des institutions. *L'Homme* 135:65-85
- Abélès M, Bellier I. 1996. Administrative and political cultures in the European institutions. *Proc. Counc. Eur. Stud.*, 10th, Mar. 14-16, Chicago
- Ammon U, Dittmar N, Mattheier KJ, eds. 1987-1988. *Sociolinguistics: An International Handbook of the Science of Language and Society*. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter
- Anderson B. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso
- Appadurai A. 1991. Disjuncture and difference in a global culture economy. In *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, ed. M Featherstone, pp. 295-311. London: Sage
- Arendt H. 1958. (1951). *The Origin of Totalitarianism, Part Two: Imperialism*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
- Ariès P, Béjin A. 1985. *Western Sexuality. Practice and Precept in Past and Present Times*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Badone E. 1991. Ethnography, fiction, and the meanings of the past in Brittany. *Am. Ethnol.* 18(3):518-45
- Bakhtin M. 1981. *The Dialogic Imagination*. Transl. C Emerson, JM Holmquist. Austin: Univ. Tex. Press
- Balibar E. 1991. The nation form: history and ideology. In *Race, Class, Nation: Ambiguous Identities*, ed. E Balibar, I Wallerstein, pp. 622-33. New York: Routledge
- Bance A. 1992. The Idea of Europe. From Erasmus to ERASMUS. *J. Eur. Stud.* 22: 1-19
- Barclay J. 1612. (1633). *The Mirror of Minds*. London: Walkley
- Barthes R. 1972. *Mythologies*. New York: Hill & Wang
- Bechdolf U, Kalliopi-Hatzistrati P, Johannsen S, Knecht M, Kromer H, et al. 1993. *Watching Europe: A Media and Cultural Studies Reader*. Tübingen: Tübingen Ver. Volkssk.
- Benevolo L. 1995. *The European City*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Bergelman J-C, Pauwels C. 1992. Audiovisual policy and cultural identity. *Media Cult. Soc.* 14(2):169-85
- Bernadini G. 1992. Tourism and cultural policy in EC policy. In *Cultural Tourism and Regional Development*, ed. P Friesland, pp. 3-5. The Hague: Leeuwarden
- Bhabha H, ed. 1990. *Nation and Narration*. London: Routledge
- Blok A. 1974. *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Boissevain J. 1975. Introduction: towards a social anthropology of Europe. In *Beyond Community: Social Process in Europe*, ed. J Boissevain, J Friedl, pp. 9-17. The Hague: Dep. Educ. Sci. Neth.
- Boissevain J, ed. 1996. *Coping with Tourists: European Reactions to Mass Tourism*. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books
- Borneman J. 1997. Towards a theory of ethnic cleansing: territorial sovereignty, heterosexuality and Europe. In *Subversions of International Order: Studies in the Political Anthropology of Culture*, pp. 273-319. Albany: South. Univ. NY Press
- Bourdieu P, Passeron J-C. 1977. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
- Brague R. 1992. *Europe, La Voie Romaine*. Paris: Criterion
- Brown P. 1996. *The Rise of Western Christendom*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Brubaker R. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationalhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
- Castiglione B. 1976. (1578). *The Book of the Courtier*. Transl. G Bull. Harmondsworth: Penguin
- Chapman M. 1995. Patronage, social anthropology and Europe. See MacDonald 1995, pp. 2-8
- Chock P. 1987. The irony of stereotypes: toward an anthropology of ethnicity. *Cult. Anthropol.* 2:347-68
- Cole J, Wolf ER. 1974. *The Hidden Frontier*. London/New York: Academic
- Costa J. 1993. The periphery of pleasure or pain: consumer culture in the EC Mediterranean of 1992. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 81-98
- Crick M. 1989. Representations of international tourism in the social sciences: sun, sex, sights, savings and servility. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 18:307-44
- Curtis B. 1993. Gazza's tears: football, masculinity and playing away in watching Europe. See Bechdoff et al 1993, pp. 79-96
- Demetz J-M. 1996. Drogue: Le Doute N^oerlandais. *L'Express* June:82-84

- de Swaan A. 1995. *The Language Constellation of the European Union. A Perspective from the Political Sociology of Language*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Sch. Soc. Sci.
- Donnan H, Wilson T. 1994. An anthropology of frontiers. In *Border Approaches: Anthropological Perspectives on Frontiers*, ed. H Donnan, T Wilson. Lanham, MD: Univ. Press. Am.
- Eco U. 1995. *The Search for the Perfect European Language*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Elias N. 1978. *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners, Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Erikson T. 1993. *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto
- Fanelli F. 1993. Our museums are Italy's General Motors. *Art Newsp.* 33:6-7
- Fernandez J. 1986. The mission of metaphor in expressive culture. In *Persuasions and Performances, The Play of Tropes in Culture*, ed. J Fernandez, pp. 28-72. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press
- Fontana J. 1995. *The Distorted Past: A Re-Interpretation of Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Foucault M. 1980. *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*. New York: Vintage
- Freeman S. 1973. Introduction to studies in rural European social organization. *Am. Anthropol.* 75:743-50
- Fuss D. 1995. *Identification Papers*. New York: Routledge
- Gal S. 1991. Bartók's funeral: representations of Europe in Hungarian political rhetoric. *Am. Ethnol.* 18(3):440-58
- Garel-Jones T. 1996. Time to call the German's bluff. Inflation is the demon Europeans ought to fear, which means Britain must ensure the Euro works. *Daily Telegr.*, Jan. 7, p. 20
- Gellner E. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
- Geyer M. 1993. Resistance as ongoing project: visions of order, obligations to strangers, struggles for civil society. *J. Mod. Hist.* 64:5241-47
- Giordano M. 1987. The 'wine war' between France and Italy: ethno-anthropological aspects of the European community. *Sociol. Rural.* 27:56-66
- Goody J. 1973. *Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Goody J. 1983. *The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Goody J. 1990. *The Oriental, the Ancient and the Primitive: Systems of Marriage and the Family in the Pre-Industrial Societies of Eurasia*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Goux J-J. 1990. *Symbolic Economie after Marx and Freud*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
- Grillo RD, ed. 1980. "Nation" and "State" in Europe: *Anthropological Perspectives*. New York: Academic
- Gullick C. 1993. Cultural values and European financial institutions. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 203-21
- Habermas J. 1987. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press
- Hajnal J. 1965. European marriage patterns in perspective. In *Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography*, ed. DV Glass, DEC Eversley, pp. 101-47. London: Arnold
- Harlig J, Csaba P, eds. 1995. *When East Meets West: Sociolinguistics in the Former Socialist Bloc*. New York: Mouton de Gruyter
- Hay D. 1957. *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*. New York: Harper & Row
- Hayden R. 1996. Imagined communities and real victims: self-determination and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia. *Am. Ethnol.* 23(4):783-801
- Herzfeld M. 1987. *Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Herzfeld M. 1992. *The Social Production of Indifference: The Symbolic Roots of Bureaucracy in Western Europe*. Oxford: Berg
- Herzfeld M. 1997. *Cultural Intimacy. Social Poetics in the Nation State*. New York: Routledge
- Hobsbawm E. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Hofer T. 1994. *Hungarians Between "East" and "West," National Myths and Symbols*. Budapest: Mus. Ethnogr.
- Huarte J. 1976. (1575). *Examen de Ingenios Para Las Ciencias*. Madrid: Ed. Nac.
- Huseby-Darvas E. 1987. Elderly women in a Hungarian village: childlessness, generativity and social control. *J. Cross-Cult. Gerontol.* 2:15-42
- Im Hof U. 1994. *The Enlightenment*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Jaffe A. 1993. Farming styles and intermediate structures in the wake of 1992. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 61-80
- Johnson R. 1993. Towards a cultural theory of the nation. An English-Dutch dialogue. In

- Images of the Nation. Different Meanings of Dutchness, 1870–1940*, ed. A Galema, B Henkes, H te Velde, pp. 159–217. Amsterdam: Ed. Rodolphi
- Judt T. 1996. Europe: the grand illusion. *NY Rev. Books* 43(12):6–9
- Jurjus A. 1993. Farming styles and intermediate structures in the wake of 1992. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 99–122
- Kantorowicz E. 1957. *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
- Kaschuba W. 1994. Everyday culture. In *Aspects of European Cultural Diversity*, pp. 189–264. London: Open Univ.
- King A, ed. 1991. *Culture, Globalization and the World System. Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*. London: Macmillan
- Lepsius MR. 1988a. Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Zukunft des Nationalstaates. Demokratie in Deutschland: Soziologisch-historische Konstellationsanalysen. In *Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen*, ed. MR Lepsius, pp. 249–64. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht
- Lepsius MR. 1988b. Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Zukunft des Nationalstaates oder Nationalitätenstaat als Modell für die Weiterentwicklung der der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Demokratie in Deutschland: Soziologisch-historische Konstellationsanalysen. In *Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen*, ed. MR Lepsius, pp. 265–85. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht
- LiPuma E, Meltzoff SK. 1989. Toward a theory of culture and class: an Iberian example. *Am. Ethnol.* 16(2):313–34
- Løfgren O. 1989. The nationalization of culture. *Ethnol. Eur. J. Eur. Ethnol.* 19:5–25
- MacDonald M. 1993. The construction of difference: an anthropological approach to stereotypes. In *Inside European Identities*, ed. S McDonald, pp. 219–36. Providence/Oxford: Berg
- MacDonald M, ed. 1995. *Towards an Anthropology of the European Union*. Brussels: Eur. Comm.
- MacDonald M. 1996. 'Unity in diversity': some tensions in the construction of Europe. *Soc. Anthropol.* 4:47–60
- Maier C. 1975. *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilizing in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War One*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
- McCannell D. 1976. *The Tourist*. London: Macmillan
- McDonough G. 1993. The face behind the door: European integration, immigration and identity. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 143–65
- Mollat du Jourdin M. 1993. *Europe and the Sea*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Moore SF. 1987. Explaining the present: theoretical dilemmas in processual ethnography. *Am. Ethnol.* 14(4):727–51
- Mosse G. 1985. *Nationalism and Sexuality*. New York: Basic Books
- Mosser F. 1994. Monuments historiques et tourisme culturel. Quel projet pour quels publics? *Cah. Espace* 37:23–27
- O'Dowd L, Wilson T, eds. 1996. *Borders, Nations and States. Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe*. Aldershot: Avebury
- Pina-Cabral J. 1992. The primary social unit in Mediterranean and Atlantic Europe. *J. Mediterr. Stud.* 2(1):25–41
- Pitt-Rivers J. 1954. *The People of the Sierra*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Ranum O. 1975. *National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
- Richards G, ed. 1996. *Cultural Tourism in Europe*. Oxford: CAB Int.
- Said E. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Basic Books
- Schneider J, Schneider P. 1976. *Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily*. New York: Academic
- Schulze H. 1996. *States, Nations and Nationalism from the Middle Ages to The Present*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Segal H. 1991. "The European." Allegories of racial purity. *Anthropol. Today* 7(5):7–9
- Segalen M. 1986. *Historical Anthropology of the Family*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Segalen M, Gullestad M, eds. 1995. *La Famille en Europe: Parenté et Perpétuation Familiale*. Paris: Découverte
- Shore C. 1993. Inventing the people's Europe: critical approaches to European community cultural policy. *Man* 28:779–800
- Shore C. 1995. Usurpers or pioneers? EC bureaucrats and the question of European consciousness. In *Questions of Consciousness*, ed. AP Cohen, N Rapport, pp. 217–36. New York: Routledge
- Shore C, Black A. 1992. The European communities and the construction of Europe. *Anthropol. Today* 8(3):10–11
- Shutes M. 1991. Kerry farmers and the European community: capital transitions in a rural Irish parish. *Irish J. Sociol.* 1:1–17
- Shutes M. 1993. Rural communities without family farms? Family dairy farming in the post-1993 EC. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 100–23

- Smith V. 1989. *Hosts and Guests: The Anthropology of Tourism*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Strathern M. 1992. *Reproducing the Future: Essays on Anthropology, Kinship and the New Reproductive Technologies*. New York: Routledge
- Tilly C. 1990. *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 1990–1992*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Tilly C. 1993. *European Revolutions, 1492–1992*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Varenne H. 1993. The question of European nationalism. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 223–40
- Verdery K. 1996. *What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
- Willis P. 1977. *Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press
- Wilson T. 1989. Large farms, local politics and the international arena: the Irish tax dispute of 1979. *Hum. Organ.* 48(1):60–70
- Wilson T. 1993a. An anthropology of the European community. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 1–24
- Wilson T. 1993b. Frontiers go but boundaries remain: the Irish border as a cultural divide. See Wilson & Smith 1993, pp. 167–88
- Wilson T. 1995. The anthropology of the European Union. *ECSA Newsl.* 8:12–15
- Wilson T. 1996. Sovereignty, identity and borders: political anthropology and European integration. In *Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe*, ed. L O'Dowd, T Wilson, pp. 199–219. Aldershot: Avebury
- Wilson T, Smith ME, eds. 1993. *Cultural Change and the New Europe: Perspectives on the European Community*. Boulder: Westview
- Wolf E. 1982. *Europe and the People Without History*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Wright S, ed. 1994. *Anthropology of Organizations*. London/New York: Routledge
- Zabusky S. 1995. *Launching Europe: An Ethnography of European Cooperation in Space Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
- Zolberg A. 1983. The formation of new states as a refugee-generating process. *Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.* 467:24–38